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 Summary: Drawing on evidence from the United States and Germany, this paper offers a 
survey of the effects of worker representation (in unions and works councils) and 
innovative work practices on firm performance. The interaction between worker 
representation and high performance work practices provides a practical means of peering 
inside the black box of the collective voice model, even if there is as yet no well-
determined hierarchy for productivity performance and certainly no blue-print for the 
future of unions. An addendum sketches the British evidence. 
 
Zusammenfassung: Basierend auf der Evidenz für die USA und Deutschland gibt dieses 
Papier einen Überblick über die Effekte der Arbeitnehmervertretung in Unternehmen (via 
Gewerkschaften bzw. Betriebsräten) und die Wirkung innovativer Arbeitsplatz–Praktiken 
auf die Leistung von Unternehmen. Indem der Zusammenhang zwischen 
Arbeitnehmervertretung und auf Hochleistungen ausgerichteten Arbeitsplatz-Praktiken 
dargestellt wird, ergeben sich Einsichten in die Black Box des Modells „kollektiven 
Widerspruchs“ (collective voice); allerdings gibt es bislang noch keine klar bestimmte 
Hierarchie bezüglich der Produktivitätsentwicklungen und sicherlich auch kein 
allgemeines Modell zur Zukunft der Gewerkschaften. In einem Ergänzungsteil werden die 
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II 1.  Introduction 
In this paper we examine the associations between worker representation (i.e. in unions 
and works councils), employee involvement/innovative work practices, and various 
indicators of firm performance.1 The two themes of workplace representation and 
innovative workplace practices have historically been analyzed separately, although in 
recent years they have shown more overlap. There are a number of reasons for this 
historical apartheid. First, the (linking) theme of collective voice was first applied to 
unions, where it shared equal billing with unionism’s monopoly face.2 Second, employee 
involvement has tended to be seen as management-led and thus as a human resource 
management technique emphasizing high-commitment employment practices. (At the price 
of some imprecision, we will equate innovative work practices with high performance 
work practices and use both interchangeably with employee involvement.) Third, and 
coinciding with the decline in unionism and growth in human relations practices, there has 
been the suggestion that the unions and employee involvement are alternatives.3
On the other hand, several other forces have encouraged a more integrationist approach. 
First, developments in the collective voice model have emphasized cooperation and the 
possibility that institutional innovation might allow a decoupling of distribution from 
production and workplace issues. Second, the reduced bargaining power of unions might 
have produced the same result and elevated the pro-productive aspects of unionism 
subsumed under collective voice. The bottom line is that although most analyses of worker 
representation and employee involvement/high performance work practices have been 
conducted in isolation – while sometimes including the other as a control – research is 
beginning to consider their interaction. 
In the present treatment, we will consider developments in the United States and Germany, 
only noting the British literature in qualification and en passant. The U.S. experience is of 
interest because it provides one of the least positive assessments of union impact while yet 
offering some early evidence of there being a mutually supportive relationship between 
union presence and employee involvement. The German experience is of interest because 
workplace representation occurs through the mechanism of the works council rather than 
the union. Historically, the works council has been viewed as the exemplar of collective 
voice because of its array of information, consultation, and participation/codetermination 
rights. Latterly, with the recognition of the bargaining problem, the German institution has 
become ever more closely identified with the expression of pro-productive voice by reason 
                                                 
1 The composite employee involvement/innovative work practices has no settled meaning. I will use it to include profit-
sharing/share ownership arrangements, consultative bodies, team working, quality circles and problem-solving groups, 
briefing groups, systematic use of the management chain to communicate, and regular meetings with senior 
management plus benchmarking, total quality management (TQM), training, job security, job rotation, and payment for 
skill acquisition, inter al. 
2 There is inevitably some artificiality in this separation. For example, some models in the spirit of collective voice stress 
that successful employee involvement requires the presence of a union before workers will practice consummate as 
opposed to perfunctory cooperation (LEVINE/TYSON, 1990). 
3 For an exhaustive set of tests of the hypothesis for Britain, see MACHIN/WOOD (2005). 
1 of its ‘peace obligation’ and the dual system of industrial relations within which it is 
embedded. That said, there has been comparatively little analysis of the interaction of 
workplace representation with more direct employee involvement mechanisms, although 
analysis of the training function might provide a promising bridge. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. To set the scene for our discussion of the empirical 
evidence, we first offer some theoretical conjectures on the efficiency properties of worker 
representation and employee involvement mechanisms. We next discuss for the United 
States the impact on firm performance of unions, employee involvement/high performance 
work practices, and their interaction. We follow this with a broadly parallel analysis for 
Germany, now with works councils substituting for the union institution. An interpretative 
section concludes. 
2.  Theoretical Conjectures 
The arguments favouring unionism, works councils, and employee involvement/high 
performance work practices (EI/HPWP) are closely linked. Thus, the principal works 
council model is unambiguously an extension of the collective voice model, first advanced 
to make the case for unionism; the scope for EI/HPWP to improve performance rests on 
many of the same arguments used in the voice model; and the innovative work practices 
identified in the EI/HPWP literature may pierce the veil of the collective voice model 
which is opaque on mechanisms. 
The collective voice model advanced by FREEMAN/MEDOFF (1984) is properly 
represented as a union voice-institutional response model. While arguing that voice is 
synonymous with (autonomous) unions, the authors are also concerned to make the point 
that voice cannot succeed without an appropriate response from management (and then 
from unions in response to any changes proposed by management). FREEMAN/MEDOFF 
(1984, p 165) write: “Some managements will adjust to the union and turn unionism into a 
positive force at the workplace; others will not. Over the long run, those that respond 
positively will prosper while those that do not will suffer in the market place.” 
The centrepiece of collective voice is the union role in providing information. The labour 
market context is important here: it is characterized by continuity rather than spot market 
contracting because of on-the-job skills specific to the firm and the costs attaching to 
worker mobility and labour turnover.
 Given the information problem in such complex and 
multidimensional continuity markets, there are two basic mechanisms to elicit information 
on worker preferences or discontent. Quit behaviour can provide such information either 
inferentially or directly (via exit interviews). However, the collective voice model contends 
that such information is likely to suffer from selection biases, from problems of motivating 
the worker to disclose information when there is no benefit from doing so (and the 
certainty of some positive cost), and finally from the sheer cost of the process of trial and 
error in determining the efficacy of contract innovations.  
The other mechanism is voice. Collective voice through the agency of a union may 
outperform individual voice for several reasons. One reason is that non-rival consumption 
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of shared working conditions (e.g., safety conditions, line speeds, and grievance 
procedures) and common workplace rules create a public goods problem of preference 
revelation. Without some collective form of organization, there will be too little incentive 
for the individual to reveal his or her preferences since the actions of others may produce 
the public good at no cost to that individual. Unions collect information about the 
preferences of all workers and ‘aggregate’ them to determine the social demand for such 
public goods. Substituting average preferences for marginal preferences and arbitraging of 
worker preferences may be efficient in such circumstances. Unions can determine the 
social demand for such goods, thereby enabling firms to choose a more efficient mix of 
personnel policies. 
A second public goods dimension of the workplace stems from the nature of the input of 
effort. Without some form of collective organization, so this argument runs, the 
individual’s incentive to take into account the effects of his actions on others may be too 
small, just as with preference revelation. This problem will only arise where there are 
significant complementarities in worker effort inputs, so that output may depend on the 
lowest level of input by any one worker. In short, collective organization may potentially 
increase output through a joint determination of effort inputs and perhaps more so through 
increased cooperation between workers in continuity labour markets.4  
The expression of collective voice is expected to reduce exit behaviour: quits, absenteeism, 
malingering, and even “quiet sabotage.” The reduction in quits in particular is expected to 
lower hiring and training costs and increase firm-specific investments in human capital. 
Apart from training effects, lower quits (inter al.) should also occasion less disruption in 
the functioning of work groups. Reduced exit behaviour is the most tangible source of 
potential efficiency gain (to the parties) in the model.  
The other main aspect of collective voice is governance. In the context of the continuity 
relation, governance refers to the policing or monitoring of incomplete employment 
contracts. Governance will involve the use of grievance and arbitration procedures and 
other mechanisms to mitigate problems stemming from the authority relation. Such 
arrangements should help improve the flow of information between the two sides. The 
difficulty is that these specialized procedural arrangements are not unique to union 
settings, so that the argument presumably must be that unions make it easier (i.e. less 
costly) to negotiate and administer these arrangements. Unions may then facilitate long-
term efficient contracting. A union specializing in information about the contract and in the 
representation of workers can prevent employers from engaging in opportunistic 
behaviour. Workers may withhold effort and cooperation when the employer cannot 
credibly commit to take their interests into account. Fearing dismissal, workers may be 
unwilling to invest in firm-specific skills or disclose information facilitating pro-productive 
innovations at the workplace.5 The formation of a union and the introduction of a system 
                                                 
4 For the public goods argument to have force, two further conditions must be met – both of which are contained in 
FREEMAN (1976, p. 362). First, costs must be incurred in using external markets: if quitting were costless, the 
individual worker could simply choose the employer whose working conditions most closely approximated his/her 
own preferences. Second, the workplace must continue to be buffeted by unforeseen shocks that change the nature of 
the workplace in an informational context; otherwise, there would be no need for the union’s demand-revealing 
function after the formative match between employer and worker. 
5  The notion that unions might help increase training has formally been allied to contract enforcement by 
DUSTMANN/SCHÖNBERG (2004), who argue that the unavailability/infeasibility of long-term wage agreements 
3 of industrial jurisprudence is one way of protecting employees’ interests. In this way, 
unions may generate worker cooperation, including the introduction of efficiency-
enhancing work practices. In other words, if the reputation effects mechanism is weak, 
there is scope for unionism to be pro-productive. 
If we assume that there is a commitment problem in regular markets, an interesting side 
issue is whether the divorce of ownership and control in the modern corporation could 
make self-enforcing contracts more feasible. More feasible in the sense that management 
might be less interested in reneging on an implicit contract in the interest of short-term 
profit maximization than the owner principal; and conversely where the interests of 
managers and shareholders are more closely aligned by, say, profit- sharing schemes for 
managers. In this case much might hinge on whether unions and self-enforcing contracts 
are substitutes or complements in establishing workplace cooperation. If they are 
substitutes, any positive effect of unions on performance will be stronger in firms with less 
severe agency problems. If they are complements, unions will be more effective in firms 
where agency stimulates self-enforcing contracts. This argument is of course based on a 
very narrow view of the agency problem in corporations and must be widened to 
incorporate rent-seeking behaviour by managers which may detract from trustful and 
cooperative industrial relations and may decrease the range of feasible self-enforcing 
contracts. JIRJAHN (2003) has recently examined the relationships between unions 
(actually works councils) and self-enforcing contracts and also those between agency and 
trustful, cooperative industrial relations using information on management profit-sharing 
schemes. We shall report some of his findings when looking at the German evidence.  
While governance receives emphasis, there is virtually no discussion of bargaining power 
in the original collective voice model. But in contract theory models in which the union 
can make credible the employer’s ex ante promises there must be some threat of credible 
punishment by the union (e.g., MALCOMSON, 1983). So it seems that the governance 
argument also depends on power: union monopoly power. Unfortunately, such power 
generally involves a hold-up problem, with unions taxing the returns on tangible and 
intangible capital.  
The standard collective voice model treats the exertion of bargaining power and the 
expression of voice as distinct and offsetting facets of unionism (hence the reference to the 
“two faces” of unionism in FREEMAN/MEDOFF, 1984, p 5). Recognition of bargaining 
power is integral to the main theoretical justification for works councils in a model offered 
by one of the architects of collective voice. Thus, FREEMAN/LAZEAR (1995) argue that 
participation/codetermination will be underprovided by the market because institutions that 
give power to workers will affect the distribution as well as the size of the surplus. The 
ideas behind collective voice are fleshed out and set in a continuum bounded by 
information provision at one end and by participation or codetermination at the other. 
Freeman and Lazear argue that the joint surplus of the enterprise will increase as one 
moves cumulatively from information exchange through consultation to participation. 
                                                                                                                                                    
means that training will be underprovided in regular markets and that unions move (apprenticeship) training closer to 
the social optimum by guaranteeing trained workers at least the union wage in the future. Since wage compression is 
also involved, unions facilitate firm-financed general training in this model (see also ACEMOGLU/PISCHKE, 1999). 
The most recent British evidence is provided in ADDISON/EELFIELD (2007) 
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Among other things, information rights can help verify management claims as to the state 
of nature, rendering them credible to the workforce and avoiding costly disputes that might 
even threaten the survival of the enterprise. Consultation for its part allows new solutions 
to production and other problems by reason of the non-overlapping information sets of the 
two sides and the creativity of discussion. Finally, participation or codetermination rights 
increase the joint surplus by providing workers with more job security and encouraging 
them to take a longer-run view of the firm and its prospects.  
However, Freeman and Lazear recognize that, unless constrained, these rights will give 
rise to a bargaining problem. Specifically, they argue that the workers’ share in the joint 
surplus grows with the surplus while that of capital declines both relatively and absolutely. 
The workers’ share rises because knowledge and involvement are power, so that the very 
factors that cause the surplus to rise also cause profitability to fall, with the result that 
workers will demand too much power/involvement because their share will continue to rise 
after the joint surplus has peaked. Symmetrically, employers will either oppose works 
councils or vest them with too little power because profits decline even as the surplus is 
increasing. 
Some means of third-party regulation limiting bargaining power has to be found if the 
societal benefits of worker voice are to be realized. Here, Freeman and Lazear see the 
German institution as attractive in two respects. First, the German works council cannot 
strike. Second, neither can it formally engage in bargaining over wages and other 
conditions of employment unless expressly authorized to do so under the relevant industry-
level or regional collective bargaining agreement. In this respect, the authors speak of a 
potential “decoupling” of the factors that determine the size of the surplus from those that 
determine its distribution. Left open is whether or not there is a sufficient decoupling in 
practice. Thus, even if the works council is an exemplary collective voice institution, 
theory does not provide an unambiguous answer as to its consequences for efficiency.  
Finally, the starting point of the EI/HPWP model is the notion that “workplace innovations 
change the production function in such a way as to increase the productivity of a firm’s 
inputs, in particular labour” (CAPPELLI/NEUMARK, 2001, p 739). The basic premise is 
by now familiar: workers have important private information and valuable insights into 
how to improve their jobs. There is therefore scope for beneficial trades once workers are 
trained and presented with better opportunities to exercise their skills through job redesign, 
decreased supervision, and involvement in decision making, and motivated to contribute 
through productivity bonuses (HANDEL/LEVINE, 2004, p 2). Recognition of these 
potentialities marks a shift in management philosophy from the status quo ante of 
traditional work systems and labor-management relations, even if there is considerable 
variation in how the new practices have been adopted in practice (for one taxonomy, see 
GODARD, 2004). 
EI/HPWPs ‘work’ by encouraging workers to work harder and smarter, and by inducing 
structural changes that improve performance. The idea that workers will work harder is 
based on their enjoying work more when the job is interesting and where it provides 
feedback and rewards (i.e. job enrichment). The second element more clearly reflects the 
distinct input of the worker in efficient job (re)design, not least when there are 
complementarities in production. As noted by ICHNIOWSKI ET AL (1996, pp 301-302), 
the final element reflects such factors as cross training and flexible job assignment, which 
5 can reduce the cost of absenteeism; decentralized decision making to self-managed teams, 
permitting a reduction in line management while benefiting communication; and training 
in problem solving and computer skills, which can increase the benefits of new information 
technologies. In other words, innovative work practices beget other changes that improve 
productivity independent of their effects on motivation. 
The suggestion is that the various strands of employee involvement are interdependent and 
mutually reinforcing, Edgeworth complementarities. This is the notion of ‘bundling,’ 
namely, the idea that innovative high performance work practices are more effective when 
combined with supporting management practices (e.g., MILGROM/ROBERTS, 1995). As 
suggested earlier, compensation schemes such as profit sharing can incentivize employee 
involvement, and information disclosure and training can improve worker decisions at the 
same time as job security encourages them to take a long-run view of the firm and make 
suggestions. Another example is the potential synergies between job rotation, self managed 
teams, and pay-for-skill plans. However, this should not be taken to imply that the theory 
provides unambiguous guidance on either the identification or measurement of the bundles.  
One other point needs to be made. Although many of these arguments are consonant with 
the voice model, the conjunction of the growth in EI/HPWP and the decline in unionism at 
least raises the possibility that the two may be substitutes, either by design or by effect 
(i.e., by enhancing worker satisfaction they may reduce the demand for unionism). This is 
not without consequence for the empirical work reviewed below in which the maintained 
hypothesis is often that the two institutions are complementary. 
In sum, there are theoretical grounds for supposing that both collective voice and 
EI/HPWP can improve the productivity of the workplace. Some observers profess to see 
little difference in the arguments for workplace representation and EI/HPWP when the 
industrial relations system offers some means of some means of decoupling production 
from distribution issues. Others might still argue that traditional workplace representation 
through unions is important to the success of innovative work practices – by, say, 
providing greater assurance that a serious hearing will be given to employees’ suggestions, 
or by virtue of union access to higher levels of management – or, backhandedly, that such 
practices offer a bigger payoff in union regimes with the elimination of restrictive 
practices, reminding us that in all such cases the monopoly face of unions has to be taken 
into account. Study of the effect of workplace representation on firm performance would 
seem to be quite closely bound up with the EI/HRWP issue. Moreover, comparisons 





3.  U.S. Evidence 
We next review U.S. findings on the determinants of firm performance, first distinguishing 
between union and employee involvement effects and then addressing the comparatively 
few treatments that have attempted to integrate the two mechanisms. 
 
3.1 Union Effects on Firm Performance 
The starting point for all analyses of union effects on firm performance must be 
BROWN/MEDOFF’S (1978) pioneering production function study of U.S. manufacturing, 
using aggregate two-digit industry data cross classified by state groups for 1972. Using an 
augmented Cobb-Douglas production function, Brown and Medoff estimate  
 
( ) ( ) () () P c L
K A L
Y 1 1 ln ln ln − − + + ≈ λ λ  
 
where Y is a value-added measure of output, L is total labour (comprising union labour Lu 
and nonunion labour Ln), A is a constant of proportionality, K is capital, λ and (1-λ) are the 
output elasticities of K and L, c indexes productivity differences between union and 
nonunion labour (c>1 indicating union labour is the more productive, and conversely for 
c<1), and P is union density, Lu/L.6  
In this framework, the coefficient estimate for P yields the logarithmic productivity 
differential of unionized establishments. Assuming this derives solely from labor inputs, 
dividing this coefficient by (1-λ) gives the union labour productivity effect. Brown and 
Medoff estimate that the productivity of unionized establishments is between 25 and 27 
percent higher than that of comparable nonunion plants, implying a union productivity 
effect of 35 to 36 percent. Interesting, as we shall see, some of the first production function 
studies for German works councils obtained similarly high estimates. 
In the years since Brown and Medoff’s study, evidence has steadily accumulated to the 
effect that average union effects in the United States are nowhere near as large as this. To 
start with, and abstracting from issues of restrictive functional form and limitations of 
value added as a measure of output, other similarly broadly-based studies have failed to 
confirm large effects. Perhaps the ‘closest’ study is by HIRSCH (1991) who estimates a 
variant of the Brown-Medoff model using data for a sample of around 570 publicly quoted 
companies over the sample period 1968-80, matched to union data for 1977. Hirsch’s OLS 
value-added production function includes in addition to capital, labour, the stock of R&D 
per employee, union density, variables measuring firm and industry growth, industry 
concentration, and import competition. He reports negative and statistically significant 
coefficients for union density (of around -17 percent). These estimates fall in absolute 
magnitude, the more detailed the industry dummies included: from -12.3 percent (2-digit 
                                                 
6 The equation assumes constant returns to scale, which constraint is relaxed by adding a measure of establishment size, 
lnL, to the regressors. 
7 level) through -8 percent (3-digit) to 3 percent (4-digit). Re-estimating the production 
function for each of 19 industries yields some positive coefficient estimates for union 
density – examples include textiles and apparel, and fabricated metal products – but the 
majority of union effects remain negative. While conceding that union effects will likely 
vary considerably by industry and cannot be estimated precisely with existing techniques 
and data bases, HIRSCH (1991, pp 104-105) nevertheless concludes that there is nothing 
to support the contention of large and statistically significant positive union productivity 
effects. Rather, union productivity effects are small on average and insufficient to offset 
the union wage differential. 
We will return to the question of estimation technique (and the issues of omitted variables 
and union endogeneity) later in this discussion, but for completeness we should also note 
some findings from an earlier manufacturing industry study that are quite consistent with 
those of Hirsch. Using data from the Profit Impact of Market Strategy (PIMS) on 902 
manufacturing businesses for 1970-80, CLARK (1984) estimates similar value-added 
equations and finds small but well determined coefficient estimates for the union variable 
in the range -2 to -3 percent. On this occasion, however, the point estimates are not 
sensitive to inclusion of detailed controls. The bottom line is that, contrary to Brown and 
Medoff, average union productivity effects are small and as likely to be negative as 
positive. This interpretation is consistent with other pieces of information having to do 
with union effects on profitability (and employment). 
Before turning to these other performance outcomes, it is important to emphasize again 
that we are speaking of average union effects and not results from individual industry and 
firm-specific studies that in principle can avoid many of the econometric and data 
problems inherent in more aggregative studies (e.g. in the measurement of output and in 
tackling input endogeneity problems). Such advantages are achieved at the price of a loss 
in generality, however, and so the goal must be to use the unique perspective of such 
studies to help inform more aggregative exercises.  
Perhaps the most important indirect piece of evidence against large pro-productive union 
effects of the magnitude suggested by BROWN/MEDOFF’S (1978) study is the U.S. 
evidence on profitability. Unlike the recent British evidence, every U.S. study points to 
reduced profitability in union settings. This result holds irrespective of the financial 
indicator used (price-cost margin, rate of return on sales or capital, or market valuation of 
the firm’s assets/Tobin’s q), unit of observation (aggregate industry, firm, or line of 
business), or methodology. On the basis of the 16 studies reviewed in ADDISON/HIRSCH 
(1989), unions are associated with 10 to 15 percent lower profitability. More recent studies 
provide confirmation of this central tendency and, again inconsistent with British results, 
contain little indication of any material change in the magnitude of the union effect over 
time (HIRSCH, 1991; HIRSCH AND MORGAN, 1994).  
However, and again abstracting from issues of statistical inference, the profitability 
evidence is not without controversy because the union effect might just be a transfer and 
thus neutral from an efficiency perspective (assuming perfect capital markets). Indeed, this 
is the take of FREEMAN/MEDOFF (1984, p 186). Whatever the indications to the 
contrary in the earliest U.S. literature, however, subsequent research has indicated that 
unions do not capture a significant share of potential monopoly profits. For example, in his 
evaluation of profitability (two measures: Tobin’s q and the rate of return on capital) in 
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513 firms, 1968-80, HIRSCH (1991) reports that although the four-firm industry 
concentration ratio is positively associated with profitability, the interaction between union 
density and concentration is both positive and statistically significant. In other words, the 
suggestion instead appears to be that union-nonunion differences in profitability are most 
substantial in highly competitive industries.  
There are clearly other sources of union rents such as sales growth and protected markets. 
However, the source that has most exercised U.S. researchers is distinctly competitive: the 
current and future quasi rents – or normal returns – on firm investments. U.S. research 
consistently points to a strong negative association between unionism and investment in 
physical and innovation capital (HIRSCH, 1991; BRONARS/DEERE, 1993; 
BRONARS/DEERE/TRACY, 1994; CAVANAUGH, 1998; FALLICK/HASSETT, 1999). 
The fullest analysis is by HIRSCH (1991), who again presents pooled cross-section/time-
series results for both types of investment in his sample of more than 500 firms. For capital 
investment he reports that the union firm with average coverage has annual capital 
investment that is 13 percent lower than its nonunion counterpart. The direct effect of 
unionism or the union tax on the returns to long-lived capital contributes a little under one-
half of this effect. The other 7 percent is an indirect effect operating via the union impact 
on profitability, profits being an important determinant of capital investment. For R&D 
expenditures, unionized companies invest some 15 percent less than do comparable 
nonunion firms. Well over three-quarters of this effect is now direct, resulting from the 
union tax. We should also note that Hirsch reports that union coverage is negatively 
associated with the ratio of advertising expenditures to sales. Furthermore, union coverage 
is also positively related to the propensity to patent, which should reduce the liability of the 
firm to hold up, ceteris paribus. That said, union coverage is unrelated to the ratio of debt 
to equity, higher values of which might be expected to lessen exposure to hold up (see, 
inter al., BALDWIN, 1983). 
The U.S. evidence on investments in tangible and intangible capital does not augur well for 
long-run productivity growth in unionized companies. However, this implication is not 
corroborated in the productivity growth literature, where the slower growth in unionized 
firms is due to a disproportionate presence of unionization in industries with slower 
growth. HIRSCH (2004) contends that the implication of slowed growth in union 
companies is not inconsistent with this result because productivity growth equations 
typically control for both tangible and intangible capital. Vulgo: they address only the 
direct effects of unions, neglecting the important indirect effect operating through reduced 
investment. Accordingly, Hirsch directs our attention to the emerging employment growth 
literature (e.g. LALONDE/MARSCHKE/TROSKE, 1996; DINARDO/LEE, 2002). He 
interprets the evidence on slowed employment growth in unionized firms as the 
teleological outcome of their reduced investments in physical and intangible capital. That 
said, there is some lingering ambiguity in the notion of an employment maximand, as well 
as the potentially awkward result that unionized firms in the United States are apparently 
no more likely to fail than their nonunion counterparts.7  
                                                 
7 But for evidence of higher closure rates among union establishments in Britain, see the Addendum. The German 
evidence is noted below. 
9 Summarizing, we see that on average union effects on productivity are small, that 
profitability is significantly reduced in union settings, and that investments in physical and 
intangible capital are also materially lower. The studies on which these findings are based 
attempt to deal with potential biases stemming from omitted variables and union 
endogeneity, but they not address mechanisms that might allow unionized establishments 
to do better than this, even outperform (some) nonunion plants.  
 
3.2 The Employee Involvement/High Performance Work Practice 
Literature Background 
As CAPPELLI/NEUMARK (2001, p 738) note, the literature on work organization and 
attempts to reform it is vast. Here we offer an eclectic review of the impact of innovative 
work practices on several measures of firm performance that always has an eye to unions, 
reflecting the conjecture that participatory systems might work better in union regimes 
(LEVINE/TYSON, 1990). We preface our summary of the empirical evidence with some 
cautionary remarks on methodology that arise in this literature and are additional to the 
classic problem of omitted variable bias encountered in the union literature.  
One important preliminary issue is what constitutes high performance work practices. 
Although different researchers have used different measures (and terminology), there is 
broad agreement that employee involvement is central to the definition (e.g. 
APPLEBAUM/BATT, 1994). More concretely, TQM programs, quality circles, functional 
flexibility, and teamwork are core elements of HPWP. Aiding such practices are individual 
and organizational supports (the terminology is that of FORTH/MILLWARD, 2004, p 
100). Examples of the former are information disclosure, job rotation, and training, while 
the latter include job security guarantees, internal labour market structuring, and financial 
participation. Management practices that are difficult to fit into this mould, but are no less 
central, include benchmarking and computer usage. Despite this agreement, as 
HANDEL/LEVINE (2004, pp. 14-15) note, measurement problems arise because there is 
no theoretical guidance on which combination of practices might be more effective and no 
unambiguous way of measuring the bundles. As we shall see, researchers have used 
interaction effects, additive indices, factor analysis, and combinations supported by a priori 
reasoning. A potentially major complicating factor is that survey data may not go beyond 
identifying the presence of a practice, neglecting its reach, coverage and intensity.  
Another important issue that needs to be raised at the outset is the diffusion of high 
performance work practices. Researchers typically do not have information on when a 
particular practice was initially introduced and typically do not have information on when 
it was discontinued. If researchers are observing a situation in cross section that is late in 
the diffusion of the practice in question, then any pro-productive effect will likely be 
biased downward. Also, there is a potentially serious loss of information arising from the 
failure to observe situations in which practices were discontinued. Even if the researcher 
has information on changes in practice (in either direction), and abstracting from 
measurement error, the panels are typically too short to accommodate learning effects. The 
bigger problem is of course that the number of changes in innovative practices in the 
typical panel is simply too small to take advantage of panel estimation techniques.  
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The studies we next examine in detail are among the most recent U.S. empirical inquiries 
of workplace innovations. Since we focus on direct performance measures they do not 
include work on the relationship between EI/HPWP and earnings (for a review of which 
see HANDEL/LEVINE, 2004, Table 2). They constitute part of what 
CAPPELLI/NEUMARK (2001, p. 739) call the ‘second wave’ of research on 
organizational performance are very much in the spirit of the wider employee 
involvement/high performance work practice literature. Table 1 provides the bare bones.  
Unionism is almost incidental in the first three studies in the table, and even when a union 
measure is included in the array of control variables its influence on the outcome indicator 
is scarcely documented. The leitmotiv of these studies is the attempt to make the best use 
of longitudinal and cross section data. In the case of the first row entry of Table 1, the goal 
is indeed methodological: HUSELID/ BECKER (1997) provide a follow-up study of an 
earlier cross-section analysis by one of the authors (HUSELID, 1995), now using panel 
data for 1993-96 to control for firm fixed effects while examining the sensitivity of the 
latter to measurement error.8
Huselid and Becker identify no less than 13 ‘human resource management practices’ and 
consider their impact on two measures of financial performance. Factor analysis is used to 
construct two factors measuring the extent of use each of the practices. The two factors are 
termed ‘employee skills and organizational structures’ and ‘employee motivation,’ 
suggesting that they may include constituent elements that others might not consider to be 
high performance practices (GODARD, 2004, p 354). The control variables comprise 
capital intensity, employment, union coverage, the R&D sales ratio, and sales growth. The 
upshot of the authors’ analysis is that factors having a statistically significant effect on 
financial performance in (three out of four) cross section(s) were no longer significant 
using a fixed effects specification. The story does not end here as Huselid and Becker 
report sizeable measurement error in the workplace practices. Based on independent 
estimates of the measurement error (Cronbach’s alpha), they argue that the fixed effects 
estimates become closer to the cross section estimates and in particular that a one standard 
deviation increase in a unidimensional measure (being the sum of the two dimensions 
noted above) of high performance work systems increases the market valuation of the 
corporation by $15,000 per worker. However, as noted by CAPPELLI/NEUMARK (2001, 
p 741), the problem of measurement error is exacerbated in a short panel of this nature 
because most firms would have had the work practices in question so that we would expect 
there to be little difference in their use over the two-year interval in question (the practices 






8 HUSELID (1995) reported that his additive indices of HPWPs were associated with reduced labour turnover, higher 
sales per employee, and improvements in (one measure of) financial performance among his cross-section sample of 
986 firms. Table 1. Selected U.S. studies examining the effect of employee involvement/high performance work practices on firm performance 





1991 sample of 820 
publicly-quoted companies 
with more than 100 
employees; and a panel of 
218 companies, 1991-93, 
also used in cross section 
for 1991 and 1993. 
Cross section, fixed effects, and 
random effects models. 
Dependent variable: financial 
performance, measured by 
Tobin’s q and the gross rate of 
return on assets. 
13 high performance work practices. 
Factor analysis used to identify 2 
factors or groupings, and scales 
constructed for each factor by 
averaging those questions loading 
clearly on each respective factor. 
However, since the effects of a change 
in the human resource system was 
found to be the same whether it 
occurred through a unit change in 
either factor, the authors subsequently 
sum the two dimensions. 
 
Union coverage 
included in the 
control set, but 
its effect not 
separately 
identified. 
Strong effects of human resource strategy (factors 
and summed factors) on financial performance 
reported in cross section. Specifically, a one standard 
deviation increase in the firm’s usage of high 
performance work systems increased Tobin’s q by 
14% and the accounting rate of return by between 13 
and 28%. In the fixed effects specifications, however, 
the effects were only one-fourth as large and were 
statistically insignificant throughout. However, 
correction for measurement error in the panel is 
claimed to yield impact effects that are in line with 







36 production lines of 17 
steel producers. Up to 
2,190 monthly 
observations in the panel. 
OLS and fixed effects 
engineering production 
functions. Dependent variable: 
production uptime, namely, the 
fraction of scheduled operating 
time that the line actually runs.  
Up to 15 individual human resource 
management variables are identified. 
Grouped into 4 HRM ‘systems’ from 
HRM1 (‘traditional’) where none of 
(11) practices were encountered to 
HRM4 (‘innovative’) where all 
practices are found. Identification of 
grouping is on the basis of inspection, 
but also supported by/robust to 
statistical classification procedures. 
Models include up to 25 controls for 
detailed features of the line (e.g. line 




union status of 
the production 
line. 
OLS results show that uptime increases 
monotonically in degree of HRM innovation. Fixed 
effect estimates – based on HRM group changers – 
also indicates this positive hierachical pattern. 
Estimated productivity effects very similar across 
specifications. No real indication that individual 
HRM practices or unionism have an additional (to 
HRM group) effect on the production measure in 
either OLS or fixed effect specifications. In short. 







Surveys of 1994 and 1997 
matched to the 1977 
Longitudinal Research 
Database (LRD) to 
provide panels for 1977-93 
and 1977-96. Number of 
observations is 443 and 
666 respectively. It is 
assumed that EI/HPWP 
measures were only 
introduced some time after 
1977 so that their ‘levels’ 
observed in 1993 and 1996 
can be used in first 
difference estimates.  
 
OLS regressions for 1993 and 
1996 cross sections and for 
models in first differences. 
Dependent variables: log sales 
per worker; log labour costs per 
worker; log of the inverse of 
unit labour costs. 
11 work practices including 
benchmarking and computer usage in 
addition to ‘employee involvement 
mechanisms’ (team working and 
TQM) and supportive measures (job 
rotation, gain-sharing, etc.) These 
considered singly and severally in 6 




included in the 
control 
variables. 
The results for productivity indicate a positive 
association between individual practices and log 
sales per worker. But statistical significance is weak 
and the effect is further attenuated in first difference 
estimates. Some evidence of potential synergies in 
the bundles but the balance of the main and 
interactive effects is seldom statistically significant. 
The results for labour costs suggest that several 
practices increase costs in roughly similar amounts to 
the productivity effects. No indications of any 




841manufacturing firms in 
Michigan, 1989. 
OLS cross section estimates. 
Dependent variable: company 
performance, defined as value 
added net of labour cost per 
employee. Three separate 
regressions for value-added per 
employee, average hourly 
wages, and labour costs as a 
Employee participation, as proxied by 
presence of work teams, and group-
based incentives, as measured by 
existence of profit/gain sharing plans.  
Union status of 







Union firms are 13% more efficient than nonunion 
firms. If union firms have teams they are 35% more 
efficient than the nonunion no-team counterfactual. 
The corresponding advantage of nonunion firms with 
team working is actually negative. But the addition 
of profit/gain sharing has a much bigger relative 
payoff in nonunion than union firms (18% versus 
6.5%). The interaction of teams and profit/gain share of labour cost. Firm 
performance is thus the 
estimated value added per 
employee for the relevant 
EI/HPWP combination less the 
estimated wage difference 








sharing is modest in nonunion firms and negative in 
union firms. No significance levels of these effects 
are provided.  
5. Black and 
Lynch (2001) 
Educational Quality of the 
Workforce National 
Employers Survey (EQW-
NES) data for 1994 
matched to information 
from the LRD for 1987-93 
(n=638). 
Cobb-Douglas production 
function. Dependent variable: 
log sales per employee. Cross -
section estimates for 1994 plus 
panel analysis for 1987-93 
period. The panel analysis uses 
within and GMM estimators to 
first derive average residuals 
for each establishment. These 
residuals are then regressed on 
the EI/HPWP measures and 
other time-invariant variables 
from the 1994 EQW-NES 
(technology, worker 
characteristics, etc.) 
6 variables proxying HPWP (TQM, 
benchmarking, number of managerial 
levels, number of employees per 
supervisor, proportion of workers in 
self-managed teams, and log number 
of workers in training); 2 measures of 
‘employee voice’ (unionization, and 
proportion of worker meeting regularly 
in groups); and 2 types of profit 
sharing (for management and for 







In the cross sections only one HPWP – 
benchmarking – is statistically significant. No 
synergies between the HPWPs are detected. Of the 
other variables, the proportion of workers meeting in 
groups and profit sharing schemes for production 
workers often seem to raise productivity. Of the 
interactions tested, there is a positive association 
between unionism and profit sharing for production 
workers. The panel estimators produce basically 
similar results except that TQM now enters 
negatively as does the union variable. The latter 
effect is offset by the union-profit sharing interaction.  
 
6. Black and 
Lynch (2002) 
EQW-NES data for 1994 
and 1997. Cross-section 
sample is 1,443 firms; 
panel sample comprises 
284 firms. 
Cobb-Douglas production 
function estimates in cross 
section (1996) and first 
differences (1993-96). 
Dependent variable: log sales 
per worker. Parallel wage 
Somewhat different mix to Black and 
Lynch (2001) in row 5. In addition to 
the proportion of workers in self- 
managed teams, benchmarking, and 
the number of managerial levels, the 
HPWP set also includes ‘re-
Union presence 
plus interactions 




For the 1996 cross section, of the HPWP measures 
only the positive effect of profit sharing on 
productivity is well determined across specifications. 
The union role, but not the other voice argument is 
positive and statistically significant. But the union 
profit sharing interaction term is larger and of 
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functions are also estimated for 
1996 and 1993-96. 
engineering’ and profit sharing. 
Employee voice variables are as 
before, namely, union presence and the 
proportion of workers meeting 






opposite sign. The union re-engineering interaction 
term is positive and well determined. For the panel 
estimates, the effect of re-engineering (proportions of 
workers in self-managed teams) is positive (negative) 
and well determined. Neither voice argument is 
statistically significant. No interaction term is 
statistically significant other than that between union 
presence and the proportion of workers meeting 
regularly in groups, which is strongly positive. For 
their part, the wage regressions show further 
variation.  
Notes: See also HUSELID (1995); See also ICHNIOWSKI (1990); See also COOKE (1992). 
 
 The advantage of the study in row 2 of the table is that in examining a single process – 
steel finishing – within an industry, the problem of output heterogeneity is presumably 
minimized. And in constructing a long time series, the beginning of which is likely marked 
by an absence of high performance work practices, the impact of those practices might be 
better discerned – subject to various caveats on the diffusion of the practices in question. In 
this study, ICHNIOWSKI/SHAW/ PRENNUSHI (1997) identify 15 human resource 
management practices that cover incentive pay, recruitment and selection, teamwork, 
flexible job assignment, employment security, skills training, communication, and labor 
relations. As noted in the table, these are subsequently grouped into a hierarchy of four 
distinct human resource management systems. The delineation is on the basis of a priori 
reasoning, supported by several statistical procedures. The hallmark of this study is, then, a 
hypothesized complementarity of workplace practices. The workplace practices are 
accompanied by detailed controls (among the time-varying regressors included in the fixed 
effects specifications are age of line, start-up periods, the quality of steel input, and the 
introduction of new equipment). The dependent variable is product uptime.  
It is reported that the more innovative human resource systems that significantly increase 
line uptime in cross section have similar effects when controlling for permanent 
unobserved line heterogeneity, unlike the study by Huselid and Becker in row 1 of the 
table. Consistent with that study, however, is the finding of complementarity in 
employment practices. Individual practices have little or no incremental effect on 
productivity. That is to say, when individual practices are added to regressions containing 
the HRM systems of practices, they have little additional effect on productivity; and in 
comparing these (OLS and fixed effects) regressions with ones containing only the 
individual practices, the typically well determined estimates for the latter (including in one 
specification a negative effect of unionism) effectively vanish with the addition of the 
system effects. ICHNIOWSKI/SHAW/PRENNUSHI (1997, p 311) conclude that “systems 
of HRM practices determine productivity … while marginal changes in individual 
practices have little effect.” That said, there are some lingering ambiguities in the study 
stemming from the collinearity among practices, and no discussion of whether all practices 
in the round contributed independently of the other bundles (Godard, 2004, p 355). 
The study by CAPPELLI/NEUMARK (2001) in row 3 of the table uses information on 
working practices from a nationally representative sample of establishments based on two 
surveys (the National Employers Surveys for 1994 and 1997) with a high response rate. 
These establishments are matched to LRD data to obtain information on their performance, 
productive inputs, and other characteristics. Another distinguishing characteristic of the 
study is its use of multiple outcome indicators, the goal being to determine whether 
increases in productivity translate into improved performance by lowering unit costs.  
To all intents and purposes, the high performance work practices are only observed at one 
point in time – strictly speaking the practices are observed in two years but five such 
practices are unique to the 1994 survey while six are asked of both surveys – but a long 
panel(s) is constructed by matching establishments in the cross section data to the 1977 
LRD. Here the assumption is that the innovative work practices did not exist in 1997, so 
that the innovative practices in levels can be used in fixed effect specifications as all 
observations necessarily represent changes. The authors present results for two panels, 
1977-93 and 1977-96, as well as for two cross sections, 1993 and 1996.  
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As in the row 1 and 2 studies, CAPPELLI/NEUMARK also look for synergies in 
innovative work practices. They first enter the practices individually and then in groupings 
suggested by design (e.g., teamwork training is designed to improve performance in teams 
and should be more productive with employee meetings and self-managed teams) or prior 
research. As shown in the table, the results are mixed, pointing to few synergies and much 
evidence of heterogeneity bias in cross section. In terms of the three outcome indicators, 
the main results are that high performance work practices raise labour costs per worker, 
that they may raise productivity (sales per employee), and that they have no effects on unit 
labour costs. The last result may mean that, at a pinch, productivity and labour costs may 
be offsetting.  
The study in row 4 of the table is notable for being the first to do more than simply include 
a union variable in the control set. COOKE (1994) examines whether unionism positively 
or negatively influences the effectiveness of employee-participation programs and group-
based incentives in his sample of Michigan manufacturing firms.
  Cooke’s measure of 
performance is value added net of labour cost per employee. To calculate this magnitude 
he estimates three equations: value added per employee, wage rates, and labour cost/total 
cost. That is to say, he subtracts the estimated wage differential, adjusted by the labour cost 
share differential, from the estimated value added per employee differential to derive the 
performance measure.  
His measure of employee involvement is a dummy variable indicating the presence or 
otherwise of team working, and his group incentives variable is another dichotomous 
variable capturing the presence or otherwise of either profit-sharing or gainsharing plans. 
These dichotomous variables are separately and jointly interacted with the union status of 
the firm; the omitted category being the compound ‘nonunion/no gainsharing/no group 
incentive pay.’ The other regressors include firm size, depreciable assets per employee 
(albeit only at the firm’s 2-digit primary industry, so that the same capital intensity is 
assigned to union and nonunion workplaces alike), and proxies for the skill composition of 
the workforce, technology, and market power.  
Using the estimated differentials associated with each combination of employee 
involvement, group incentive pay, and union status, Cooke estimates their performance 
effects. The basic result is that unions elevate pay less than they increase productivity. 
Alone among the studies, Cooke reports that firm performance is 13 percent higher in 
unionized plants without either employee involvement or incentive pay than in comparable 
nonunion firms. The introduction of team working raises this differential to around 35 
percent. By contrast, its introduction in the nonunion sector does not improve the 
innovating (nonunion) firm’s net performance. In the absence of teamwork, group 
incentive pay has a much larger effect on efficiency in nonunion firms (+18.5 percent) than 
in union firms (+6.5 percent). In combination, the two measures also have a much bigger 
performance payoff in nonunion (+21 percent) than union (-0.7 percent) firms. While 
suggesting that the payoff to employee involvement and incentive pay may sharply differ 
in union and nonunion regimes, this study clearly paints a much rosier picture of union impact than the material reviewed earlier. Unfortunately, we are not told the statistical 
significance of the effects on performance. The cross section nature of the study, the 
deficiencies of the capital measure, and issues of representativeness are additional sources 
of concern. 
The study in row 5 of the table attempts to deal with each concern. BLACK/ LYNCH 
(2001) estimate production functions for a large, nationally representative sample of 
manufacturing establishments. The authors fit augmented Cobb-Douglas production 
functions to both cross section and panel data for 1987-93, having much richer data than 
Cooke.9 The authors identify six high performance work systems (TQM, benchmarking, 
number of managerial levels, number of employees per supervisor, the proportion of 
workers in self-managed teams, and the {log} number of employees in training), two 
employee voice measures (unionization and the proportion of employees meeting regularly 
in groups), and two types of profit sharing (for management/ supervisors and 
production/clerical/technical). Panel techniques are used in an attempt to tackle a potential 
omitted variables problem due to unobserved establishment characteristics (but see below). 
Specifically, Black and Lynch use a two stage procedure that involves first estimating a 
fixed, time-invariant firm effect for each establishment using data for the time-varying 
factors – namely, capital, labour, and raw materials – and then regressing these fixed 
effects (or firm-level efficiency parameters) on all the time-invariant factors.10
The cross-sectional estimates indicate that, although most of the high performance work 
practices are positively associated with labour productivity, only benchmarking is 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Of the separate voice and profit sharing 
arguments the proportion of workers meeting regularly in groups – although not 
unionization – and nonmanagerial profit sharing are positively and significantly associated 
with productivity in most specifications. Contrary to the studies in the first two rows of 
Table 1, Black and Lynch report that there is no evidence of a synergistic bundling of the 
high performance work systems, although there is a positive and statistically significant 
association between unionization and nonmanagerial profit sharing.11 Finally, the results 
for the panel data second-step estimation are much the same as the cross-sectional results, 
although in the specification containing interaction terms the own effect of unionism 
becomes negative, much larger in absolute magnitude, and marginally statistically 
significant (even if this effect is more than counteracted by the positive interaction between 
unionism and nonmanagerial profit sharing).  
Black and Lynch use their estimates to show how unionized establishments that embrace 
what are termed “transformed” industrial relations practices can have higher productivity 
than nonunion plants. Specifically, a hypothetical union plant practicing benchmarking and 
total quality management, with 50 percent of its workers meeting on a regular basis, and 
operating profit sharing for its nonmanagerial employees is reported to have 13.5 percent 
                                                 
9 For example, their capital stock measure is constructed from information on the book value of assets in the base year 
(1987) and new investments in each year, net of an estimate of the fraction of capital that is used up each year.
10 In addition to the within estimator, the authors use a GMM estimator in the first step to deal with biases stemming 
from the endogeneity of capital, labour, and materials. 
11 The authors note that, although individually only one interaction term was statistically significant, they rejected at the 
.05 level the joint null that all four interactions were zero.  
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higher labour productivity than a nonunion plant with none of these practices. By contrast, 
the corresponding differential for a high performance nonunion establishment is just 4.5 
percent. In contrast to the row 4 study, however, if union and nonunion plants possess none 
of these workplace practices, the nonunion establishments have 10 percent higher labour 
productivity than their union counterparts. Note there is no attempt in this study to discover 
whether the workplace practices in question are positively related to average costs per 
worker (for evidence of which, see CAPPELLI/NEUMARK, 2001, in row 3).  
BLACK/LYNCH (2001, p 443) themselves note that, despite the use of panel methods, the 
regressors used in the second stage procedure referred to earlier may still be correlated 
with unobserved time-invariant plant-level characteristics, thereby biasing the coefficient 
estimates on high performance workplace practices. One such variable is of course 
managerial quality. If more able managers are found in establishments that have greater 
recourse to such practices then the effects attributed to them may simply reflect good 
management. In the last row entry of Table 1, in their new study BLACK/LYNCH (2000) 
present results from using a second wave of the dataset containing information on work 
practices and estimate a model in first differences, 1993-96 (as well in cross section for 
1996). As can be seen from the table, compared with the row 5 study there is some 
redefinition of high performance work systems, including the use of a new variable 
‘reengineering.’ Another change is that unionization is now interacted with four of the 
work practices, including the proportion of workers meeting regularly in groups. 
The results differ somewhat from BLACK/LYNCH (2001). Commenting here on just the 
fixed effects findings, we see that reengineering is the only work practice with a 
statistically significant pro-productive own effect. For its part, the own effect of 
unionization is poorly determined throughout, although when interacted with the worker 
meeting variable the effect is positive and statistically significant. The own effect of 
worker meetings is strongly negative. 
A final study not included in Table 1 nevertheless merits attention because it addresses the 
vexed issue of contingency in a union and high performance work practice context. The 
setting is the course of productivity at a single commercial aircraft manufacturer, 1974-91. 
During the sample period there were three strikes and one work to rule, one major 
production change, three (five) changes in top management (union presidents), and the 
introduction of a TQM program towards the end of the sample period that included high 
levels of employee involvement and formal assurances of job security. 
KLEINER/LEONARD/PILARSKI (2002) provide a detailed history of these industrial 
relations developments based on interviews with production managers and union leaders, 
and estimate an engineering production function to investigate the effect of these changes. 
As expected, withdrawals of labour are associated with reduced productivity; also as 
expected, it only takes between one to four months to return to pre-strike productivity. 
Union leadership also seems important, while productivity appears highest when hawks on 
both sides negotiate. The effects of TQM are if anything perverse, which result is held to 
reflect the manner of its introduction (“a top-down process that never fully won the embrace of the line workers or their front-line supervisors”) (KLEINER/LEONARD 
/PILARSKI, 2002, p 203). It is argued that TQM was bearing fruit at exactly the time 
management’s patience ran out (although the shift back to an authoritarian structure 
produced improved results in the short run). No less interesting, the authors observe that 
the effects of TQM may be upwardly biased because they fail to account for the impact of 
firms that are unsuccessful in implementing it – an inference that might be generalized to 
other practices pending improved datasets containing information on EI/HPWP 
dissolutions as well as adoptions.  
The results of the more recent U.S. literature on innovative work practices are, then, 
decidedly mixed both as regards the impact of particular practices and synergies between 
them. Abstracting from causation issues, positive effects on productivity where observed 
are only one-half the story, impact on the bottom line is the other. Contingencies may also 
cast a long shadow in reaching a judgment on the role of such practices. This setting is not 
altogether propitious for assessing the contribution of the union institution, and it is 
unsurprising that the mainstream EI/HPWP literature has practised benign neglect here. 
Yet recent U.S. evidence does point to some positive interaction effects between individual 
work practices and unionism. Indeed, even though the nature of some of the associations is 
at times opaque, it has sometimes been claimed that there is a hierarchy for productivity 
performance with unionized plants having innovative practices at the top – above those of 
nonunionized plants with the same set of practices – and at the bottom in traditional 
workplaces. This conclusion and the use of synthetic workplaces to identify hierarchies are 
premature but the literature has demonstrated potential offsets to the union wage 
differential.  
4.  German Evidence 
Reflecting the facts of workplace representation, most German studies have focused on the 
impact of works councils rather than unions, although interest in the union role – strictly, 
the collective agreement external to the establishment – has increased in the wake of 
FREEMAN/LAZEAR’S (1995) extension of the voice model.12
 
4.1 Works Councils and Establishment Performance 
In a reversal of the pattern of the U.S. literature on worker representation, the early 
German literature pointed to mostly negative effects of works councils on firm 
performance. These studies cover a wide range of performance outcomes – total factor 
productivity, profits, product innovation and R&D, investment in physical capital  and 
                                                 
12 Indeed, since this chapter was written, there has been a mini-explosion of interest in the effect of German collective 
bargaining proper on wages. See, inter al., ADDISON/TEIXEIRA/ZWICK (2006); GERLACH/STEPHAN (2005, 
2006); GÜRTZGEN (2005, 2006); FITZENBERGER/ KOHN/LEMBCKE (2008). 
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(excessive) quits – do not lack rigor,13 and contain detailed information on establishment 
characteristics and sometimes union density (on the interaction of union density and works 
councils, see FITZROY/KRAFT, 1990; SCHNABEL/WAGNER, 1994). But they have the 
disadvantage of small sample size – typically around 100 firms/plants – raising obvious 
issues of external validity.  
More recently, analysts have been able to work with much larger data sets, namely, the 
Hannover Firm Panel, the NIFA-Panel, and the nationally representative Establishment 
Panel of the Institute for Labour Market Research, or IAB Establishment Panel. The 
Hannover Panel is a stratified random sample of all manufacturing plants with at least five 
employees in the German state of Lower Saxony, 1994-97. It comprises around 1,000 
establishments in 1994, declining to a little over 700 establishments in 1997 because of 
sample attrition. The NIFA-Panel is a survey of all establishments in the German machine-
tool industry, 1991-98. The sample base is around 6,000 firms and the realized sample 
approximates 1,500 per wave. Finally, the IAB Establishment Panel has been conducted 
each year from 1993 (for eastern Germany from 1996 onward). It is based on a stratified 
random sample – strata for 16 industries and 10 size classes – from the population of all 
establishments with at least one employee covered by social insurance. The panel is 
created to serve the needs of the Federal Labour Agency, and so its focus is on 
employment-related matters. The two other surveys contain somewhat richer establishment 
information, and, in the case of (one wave of) the NIFA-Panel, subjective data on works 
council ‘type’ and ‘degree of works council involvement’ from a management perspective 
(see DILGER, 2002). That said, the IAB Establishment Panel contains the only nationally 
representative longitudinal sample of establishments and unlike the other two data sets it is 
possible to proxy the capital stock.14
Table 2 reports results from a selection of studies using two of the new data sets. It is not 
meant to be fully inclusive of the literature for two reasons. First of all, it is deliberately 
‘light’ on the more descriptive labour turnover literature.15 Second of all, it is only one-
half the research that we review: Table 4 contains studies that also consider EI/HPWP (to 
include training). 
 
13 Among the best examples are the papers by FITZROY/KRAFT (1985, 1987, and 1990) that deploy systems of 
equations in examining profitability, total factor productivity, and innovation, respectively, in a small sample of a little 
over 60 metal working firms. The unifying theme of all three papers is a managerial pressure/managerial competence 
model: efficient managers are able to elicit greater effort from their workforces without interference from works 
councils and are also able to institute adequate systems of communication and decision-making and avoid (the delays 
associated with) works councils, partly by paying higher wages. As can be seen in Table 4, below, this model is 
qualified in a more recent study by the authors (FITZROY/KRAFT, 1995). 
14 Most recently, analysts have used data from the IAB Linked Employer-Employee Data  set (LIAB), combining data 
from the IAB Establishment Panel and the Employment Statistics Register (e.g. ADDISON/TEIXEIRA/ZWICK,  
2006) 
15 But for an interesting study of quits, hires, and labour fluctuation using the NIFA-Panel that exploits works council 
type, see DILGER (2002).  22 
The most notable feature of the studies using these large datasets is their more favourable 
evaluation of works council impact. For the two studies using the Hannover Firm Panel 
(rows 1 and 2 of the table), the pro-productive effect of the works council depends on 
establishment size and collective bargaining regime, respectively. ADDISON/SCHNABEL 
/WAGNER (2001) report that works council presence is associated with higher value-
added per employee only for the all-firm sample; for smaller establishments with between 
21 and 100 employees the association is statistically insignificant. This result might reflect 
a theme of the earlier literature to the effect that for smaller firms the advantages of 
codetermination may be lower and the costs higher than for larger firms. But the authors’ 
own justification for focusing on this sub-sample is two-fold: first, lacking information on 
works council type, it makes sense to estimate the effect of the entity for a sample in which 
the rights/powers of the works council are a datum; second, only in this employment range 
are establishments with and without works councils present in reasonable numbers, as 
opposed to being dominant (see above). Apart from there being no evidence of higher 
productivity within this sample, Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner also report that works 
councils are not associated with reduced labour turnover in this sub-sample either, 
although they obtain the conventional effect for the all-establishment sample.  
For their part, HÜBLER/JIRJAHN (row 2) emphasize not establishment size but instead 
whether or not the establishment is covered by a collective agreement. They seek to test the 
argument of FREEMAN/LAZEAR (1995) that where a works council is embedded in a 
(external) collective bargaining arrangement, the control exerted by the union and the 
employers’ federation can serve to dissipate distributional squabbles at the workplace 
allowing the voice effects to realized. As can be seen, they report that pro-productive 





Table 2. Recent estimates of the effects of works councils on performance. 











from the 1994 
wave. 
Value added per worker; 
subjective measures of 
financial performance; wages 
and salaries per employee 
(and the percentage ‘wage 
gap’); three labour turnover 
measures (hires, separations 
and gross turnover); and two 
innovation measures 
(introduction of new 
processes/products). 
Single equation estimates. 
Separate results for all -
establishment sample and subset 
of plants with 21-100 
employees. 
Works council presence. Controls 
include establishment size/age; 
measures of workforce composition 
and skill; product market 
competition; capacity utilization; 
profit sharing; state of technology; 
‘excessive’ wage costs; and industry 
dummies. 
Works council presence is associated with 
higher productivity overall but not for 
plants with 21-100 employees. Profitability 
systematically lower in works council 
regimes. Wages higher in the presence of 
works councils, but sources of these higher 
earnings are not transparent. All labour 
turnover measures are reduced in works 
council settings, other than for the subset of 
smaller establishments. Innovation measure 







data from the 
1994 and 1996 
waves. 
Value-added per employee 
and wages and salaries per 
employee. 
Bivariate probit maximum 
likelihood estimates of works 
council presence and coverage 
by collective agreement to form 
selection arguments in wage and 
productivity equations.  
Works council presence and 
coverage by a collective agreement. 
Controls include establishment 
age/size/legal status; product market 
competition; measures of workforce 
composition and skill; profit 
sharing; state of technology; team 
work; and industry dummies. 
In separate productivity regressions by 
collective bargaining status, the positive 
effect of works councils on performance is 
statistically significant only where the plant 
is covered by a collective agreement. Wages 
are higher under both collective bargaining 
regimes, although the effect is better 
determined where there is no collective 
agreement. 







1998 and 2000. 
Log value added.  OLS estimation of Cobb-
Douglas, CES, and translog 
production functions. Separate 
estimates for West and East 
Germany; summary results for 
manufacturing and services. 
Works council presence. In addition 
to log capital (proxied by 
replacement investment) and log 
employment, the regressors 
comprise: profit sharing for 
employees; process innovation; 
product innovation; employment of 
apprentices; coverage by a collective 
agreement; percentage of qualified 
employees; percentage of sales 
exported; and 14 sector dummies. 
Plants with works councils have sharply 
higher productivity of 25% (30%) in West 
(East) Germany. Disaggregation by sector 
confirms results other than for West 
German manufacturing in both 1998 and 
2000. Works council interaction with profit-











of plants with 
21-100 
employees. 
Log sales  Fixed effects stochastic frontier 
production function estimated 
separately for plants with and 
without works councils and for 
balanced and unbalanced 
panels. The comparison is 
between the technical efficiency 
estimates – and the 95% 
confidence intervals – of the 
median works council plant and 
its non-works council 
counterpart.  
 
Works council presence. Regressors 
include log employment; shares of 
part-time, skilled, and female 
employees; 41 sector dummies; and 
7 year dummies. 
There are no statistically significant 
differences in efficiency between 
establishments with and without works 
councils. Results robust to disaggregation 
by broad sector and to time interval (use of 









sample of 1,544 
establishments 
Changes in quits, sales per 
employee, employment, and 
the profit-situation. 
Nonparametric propensity score 
matching model. ‘Treated’ 
group comprises all plants in 
which a works council was set 
up between 1996 and 1998. 
Introduction of a works council.  Mean values for the performance indicators 
in establishments that experienced the 
formation of a works council are not 
statistically different from those obtaining 























Plant closings.  Probit estimates for the 
following samples: all-plants; 
plants stratified by whether or 
not they are covered by a 
collective agreement; plants 
stratified by size (less than or 
more that 50 employees); and 
plants stratified by both 
collective agreement and size. 
Works council presence. Apart from 
coverage by a collective agreement 
and establishment size, the 
covariates include plant age; 
workforce composition and skills; 
recent layoff experience; state of 
technology; regional unemployment 
rate; and industry dummies. 
For the aggregate sample, works councils 
associated with significantly higher 
closings. Works council effect is sharper for 
the uncovered sector and for smaller plants 
but the difference is not statistically 
significant. Only for small plants that are 
covered by a collective agreement is there 
any suggestion that collective bargaining 
coverage can lower closure rate.  
 The Hannover Firm Panel does not contain information on the capital stock, raising the 
potential problem of omitted variables bias. However, the capital stock may be inferred 
from data on replacement investment in the IAB Establishment Panel. Using this 
information, the study by FRICK (2003) in row 3 of the table provides one of the first 
estimates of a works-council-augmented production function for Germany (see also 
ADDISON/KRAFT/WAGNER, 1993; FITZROY /KRAFT, 1987). The magnitude of the 
works council ‘effect’ is highly reminiscent of the union effects reported by 
BROWN/MEDOFF (1978) some 25 years earlier for the United States. Plants with works 
councils have 25-30 percent higher productivity than their counterparts without works 
councils. Drawing on secondary evidence that wages are higher in works council plants, 
FRICK (2003, p 448) nevertheless cautions that these effects may not compensate firms for 
the additional costs.16  
The next two studies summarized in Table 2 that also use the IAB Establishment Panel 
question this large productivity effect of works councils (as indirectly does the final study 
in row 6). Substituting sales for value added on data grounds – for example, respondents 
often fail to answer the materials cost question in the panel survey17 – and restricting the 
sample to plants with between 21 and 100 employees, SCHANK/SCHNABEL/WAGNER 
(2004) estimate frontier productions for separate samples of firms with and without works 
councils, 1993-2000. They report no statistically significant differences in the technical 
efficiencies of the median plant in the two samples. Using a very different approach, the 
study by ADDISON/BELLMANN/SCHNABEL/WAGNER (2004) in row 5 of the table 
seeks to carefully match plants that witnessed the formation of works councils in 1998 and 
those that remained free of works councils for the entire sample period (1996-2000). For 
their four outcome indicators, including a proxy for productivity growth, they report no 
statistically significant differences in mean performance among the two types of firms. 
This study represents one attempt to deal with selection problems that dog the other 
estimates in Table 2.  
The final study in row 6 of the table is relevant from the perspective of another type of 
potential bias attaching to both cross section and (balanced) panel estimates alike, namely, 
the problem that we are observing survivors. Underperforming works council plants may 
have been evolved out of the system, leaving an unrepresentative sample of survivors. The 
study by ADDISON/BELLMANN/KÖLLING (2004) does find that other things being 
equal works council firms do fail at higher rates than their non-works council counterparts. 
Although this hints at survival bias, we would caution that this evidence is indirect (i.e., 
survivability should be modelled simultaneously with the performance equation), that the 
failure rates in question are low, and that the number of industry controls is for statistical 
reasons quite limited. 
                                                 
16 Most German studies report that the simple association between works councils and wages is positive and statistically 
significant. But there is the suggestion that the excess of wages over those agreed to in collective agreements does not 
point in the same direction (see ADDISON/SCHNABEL/WAGNER, 2001). Investigation of the works council-pay 
nexus is currently the subject of considerable research interest. 
17 No less important, the materials costs – measured as the percentage share of sales represented by materials costs – 
often seem to be little more than informed guesses. 
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Table 3. Works council coefficient estimates from a translog production function 
fitted to IAB establishment panel data, 1997-2000 
   Sector   
Sample All  Manufacturing  Services 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
      
Firms with 
21-100    
employees      
      
Pooled 0.118***  0.046 0.183*** 
  (3.22) (1.03)  (3.05) 
      
1997 0.123*  0.119*  0.098 
  (1.86) (1.73)  (0.82) 
1998 0.107*  0.063  0.145 
  (1.94) (0.94)  (0.61) 
1999 0.056  -0.011  0.139* 
  (1.16) (0.18)  (1.72) 
2000 0.172***  0.070  0.269*** 
  (3.60) (1.22)  (3.41) 
      
Firms with ≥5      
employees      
      
Pooled 0.232**  0.177***  0.275*** 
  (8.88) (5.71)  (3.05) 
   
Source: ADDISON/SCHANK/SCHNABEL/WAGNER (2003) 
Notes: The dependent variable is log total sales. In addition to the log capital stock, log number of 
employees, and works council presence, the regressors are: investment in ICT, state of technology, workforce 
composition (share of part timers, apprentices, and skilled workers), coverage by a collective agreement, a 
dummy for eastern Germany and, for the relevant pooled/cross section regressions, sector and/or year 
dummies 
|t| - values in parentheses 
***, * denote significance at the .01 and .10 levels, respectively.  
By the same token, one should continue to be wary of the ambitious pro-productive works 
council effects provided in row 3 of the table. In Table 3, we present summary results from 
fitting a translog production function to pooled data for 1997-2000 from the IAB 
Establishment Panel. The dependent variable is sales (rather than value added) and the 
sample is restricted to firms with 21-100 employees, other than in the last row of the table 
where pooled estimates for the entire sample of establishments with five or more 
employees are provided for purposes of comparison. Although works council ‘effects’ are 
in our view still uncomfortably large,  note first the differences between the coefficient  18
                                                 
18 Quantile regression analysis suggests that the large pro-productive effects for the all-establishment sample in the 
Hannover Firm Panel are driven by highly productive plants; that is, they are detected only in plants at the top end of 28 
                                                                                                                                                   
estimates in the pooled regressions for the sample comprising plants of all sizes and the 
sub-sample of establishments with 21-100 employees. Next observe the generally 
insignificant coefficients for the all-important German manufacturing sector in both pooled 
and cross-section data. Then observe the variation in the coefficient estimates in cross 
section. Finally consider that there are no a priori grounds for expecting major differences 
in works council effects as between manufacturing and services. Taken in conjunction with 
the evidence in Table 2, we would argue that although the early German literature most 
likely encouraged an overly negative view of works council operation some of the more 
recent estimates are likely to do exactly the opposite. 
 
 
4.2 EI / HPWP, Works Councils and Firm Performance 
As with the U.S. evidence on unions, however, the issue of works council impact does not 
end here. Rather more than in the United States perhaps, discussion of the effects of 
worker representation in Germany has become linked with those of innovative work 
practices. Table 4 provides a summary of the diverse literature. The themes of this 
literature, mostly based on the three large-scale datasets introduced earlier, include works 
council type, incentivization issues, complementarities, and training. Together the studies 
point to circumstances in which works councils may be associated with favourable 
productivity outcomes.  
We begin with the study by FRICK (2002) (row 1) which, although descriptive, is notable 
for its attempts to investigate directly the impact of works council type (see also DILGER, 
2002). The only large-scale data set to contain such information is the (sixth wave of the) 
NIFA-Panel. As can be seen, Frick’s results using this information are mixed. Thus, 
HPWPs are not significantly more numerous in works council plants than others and while 
‘more involved’ councils tend to have more HPWPs those works councils dubbed 
‘antagonistic’ by management have the most. Similarly, while HPWPs are reported in the 
author’s multiple classification analysis to benefit firm performance, they are also said to 
be associated with reduced labour demand. 
Unlike the other studies reviewed in Table 4, the analysis in row 2 is based on an early 
sample of just 65 metal working firms. This dataset was first used by FITZROY/KRAFT 
(1985, 1987, and 1990) in a series of studies charting the impact of works councils on 
profitability, total factor productivity, and innovation. Adverse works council effects were 
reported for all outcome indicators in systems of equations that typically endogenized 
works council presence. But FITZROY/KRAFT (1995) report that works council effects 
on labour productivity are actually positive and statistically significant in regimes 
practicing profit sharing, even if they are negative and well determined in other regimes. 
The authors attribute the positive works council effect to cooperative labour relations.  
 
 
the conditional productivity distribution (see ADDISON/SCHANK/SCHNABEL/WAGNER, 2006). The suggestion 
may be that only highly competent managers can cooperate with a works council in a way that materially advances 
productivity.  
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Table 4. Selected German studies examining the effect of innovative work practices and works councils on performance  





from the sixth 
wave of the 
NIFA-Panel. 
Dataset identifies 
five types of 
HPWP, as well as 
five types of 
works council 
and a measure of 
works council 
involvement. 
Descriptive analysis of HPWPs by 
works council presence, 
involvement, and type. Multiple 
classification analysis for same 
categories as in descriptive 
treatment and five covariates 
(number of employees, sales per-
employee, stock of orders, and 
capacity/manpower utilization). 
The five measures are: reduction 
in hierarchies; delegation of 
decision making; work groups 
with independent budgets; group 
or team work; flexible working 
time.  
Five works council 
types range from 
‘antagonistic’ to 
‘excluded.’ The  
measure of works 
council involvement 
signifies greater 
engagement of works 
council in processes of 
technological or 
organizational change 
than laid down under 
law or by collective 
agreements. 
 
Plants with works councils use more HPWPs 
than do plants without works councils, but 
difference is not statistically significant. Plants 
with more involved works councils have more 
HPWPs than their less involved counterparts. 
But the number of HPWPs is highest in 
circumstances where works council is rated 
‘antagonistic.’ HPWPs are reported to have a 
positive effect on establishment performance 







Pooled data for 
1977 and 1979 
for 65 metal 
working firms in 
West Germany. 
Value added production function 
estimated separately for profit-
sharing firms and non profit-
sharing firms, with correction for 
selection into profit sharing status. 
Also estimation of full interaction 
equation for the whole sample. 
 
Profit sharing for the workforce.  Presence of works 
council. 
The effect of works councils on productivity 
measure is negative and statistically 
significant in non-sharing firms but is positive 
and statistically significant in profit-sharing 
firms. Interaction effect between works 
councils and profit-sharing in full interaction 
equation is statistically insignificant.  3. 
Jirjahn 
(2003) 
Pooled data from 
the 1994 and 
1996 waves of the 
Hannover Firm 
Panel. 
Single-equation OLS pooled 
productivity estimates. Dependent 
variable: value added per 
employee. Auxiliary probit model 
of works council presence provided 
but not used to instrument works 
council presence. Separate 
estimates for all plants and subset 
of plants with 21-100 employees. 
 
Managerial profit sharing. Some 
innovative practices are also 
included in the probit equation 
(e.g. further training and flexible 




Executive profit sharing schemes are 
productive for both samples. The interaction 
between executive profit sharing schemes and 
works council presence is negative and 
statistically significant for the all-
establishment sample. Works council effect is 









Panel, for a 1999 
cross section and 
a 1996-99 panel. 
Cobb-Douglas production function 
with capital approximated by 
replacement investments. 
Dependent variable: value added 
and average value added. Cross-
section estimates with and without 
correction for endogeniety of 
HPWP. For the panel, the 
estimation follows the Black-
Lynch (2001) two-step procedure 
(see Table 1, row entry 5), with the 
second stage also controlling for 
the endogeneity of HPWPs.  
Six HPWPs: shifting of 
responsibilities to lower level in 
hierarchy; team work; work 
groups with independent budgets; 
employee share ownership; profit 
sharing; training to support 
organizational change; and 
incentive training. These HPWPs 
are aggregated into two 
independent factors 
(‘organizational change’ and 
‘incentives’) using principal 
components factor analysis. 
Works council presence  In cross section, the positive effect of 
‘incentives’ (share ownership, profit sharing, 
supportive training, and incentive training) 
results from their being introduced by firms 
when they are prospering. In the panel 
(second- step) estimates and after correcting 
for selection, ‘organizational changes’ 
(shifting responsibilities, team work, and 
independent work groups) have significantly 
positive effect on productivity and are also 
introduced to deal with structural problems – 
structural productivity gaps. No interaction 
between ‘incentives’ and ‘organizational 
changes.’ Separate works council effect not 
robust in cross section, but in panel estimates 
work council presence has significantly 
positive impact on the establishment-specific 










Cobb-Douglas production analysis 
function. Dependent variable: 
value-added and average value-
added. In other words, the same 
two-step procedure used by Wolf 
and Zwick (2002) but with GMM 
(GMM-SYS) estimator rather than 
within estimator alone to estimate 
the production function and the 
time-invariant establishment fixed 
effect.  
‘Participative work forms’ based 
on delegation of responsibility 
and decision making to lower-
levels in the hierarchy, team 
work, and work groups with 
independent budgets. These three 
measures are aggregated to form a 
single participation variable set 
equal to one if at least one of the 
three measures had been 
introduced by 1997. Participation 




presence, and estimated 
works council presence 
in a switching 
regression model.  
After accounting for the endogeneity of 
participative work forms, the productivity 
effect of such practices is around 25 percent. 
In the switching regression, (the instrumented 
value for) participation is only (marginally) 
statistically significant in the sample of works 
council firms. Selection into works council 







sections for 1998 
and 1999 and 
panel data for 
1997-99. 
Cobb-Douglas production function 
approach. Dependent variable: 
value added. Cross-section 
estimates of effect of continuous 
training in 1997 on labour 
productivity levels in 1998 and 
1999. Selection into training status 
handled through a probit regression 
used to calculate the probability 
that a firm offers training  and  a 
Tobit equation to predict the 
Training incidence (i.e. presence); 
training intensity (number of 
trainees divided by number of 
employees); and training type 
(formal external courses, formal 
internal courses, training on the 
job, seminars and talks, job 
rotation, self-induced learning, 
and quality circles). 
Works council 
presence. 
In cross section, (lagged) effects of training 
intensity – actual and predicted – are 
positively associated with labour productivity. 
Formal external training courses also positive 
and statistically significant throughout. 
Negative effect of training on-the-job. 
Selection term is negative. Panel estimates 
indicate that training intensity, formal external 
and internal courses, and self-induced learning 
have a positive and significant effect on 
productivity; after selection is accounted for, 32 
intensity of training.
b Fixed effects 
panel estimation using two-step 
procedure as in row 4 and 5 
studies, also with and without 
selectivity correction. 
the coefficient estimates for training intensity 
and formal training courses increase in size. 
Coefficient estimate for the works council 
dummy is positive and statistically significant 
in cross-section estimates but not in second-
step regression estimates.  






                                                
FitzRoy and Kraft find that profit sharing is associated with sharply higher productivity – 
in both single and simultaneous equation treatments. This result is not generally found in 
the large-scale data sets; for example, neither FRICK (2002) (row 3, Table 2), using the 
IAB Establishment Panel, nor HÜBLER/JIRJAHN (2003) (see row 2, Table 2), using the 
Hannover Firm Panel, observe discern this outcome.19 Abstracting from measurement 
issues (on which more below), an interesting extension of the incentives discussion is 
profit sharing for executives. The study by Jirjahn in row 3 of Table 4 finds that 
managerial profit sharing strongly improves productivity, suggesting that it attenuates 
agency problems. But this issue is only part of the story; the other is works council 
presence and its interaction with executive profit sharing. As can be seen from the table, 
the coefficient estimate for works council presence is positive and statistically significant 
while that for the interaction term is negative and again well determined. Focusing on the 
latter result, Jirjahn argues it is consistent with two hypotheses: either profit sharing 
reduces the commitment value of agency in circumstances where works councils cannot 
foster trust and loyalty absent the cooperation of management, or management rent seeking 
is curbed by profit sharing and the works council is not important for building cooperation 
in situations of reduced opportunism on the part of management. Although these empirical 
findings have yet to be replicated in other data sets, central to Jirjahn’s approach is the 
notion that the management environment of the firm matters in evaluating works council 
impact. His approach is also very much in the spirit of collective voice model, even if the 
contribution of the works council is not transparent. This latter remark in turn reflects some 
negative correlations noted in the literature such as that between team work and works 
councils, and most of all the simple fact that the magnitude of the negative interaction term 
between works councils and executive profit sharing exceeds that of the positive point 
estimate for works council presence. 
The remaining three studies in Table 4 follow a common methodology suggested in part by 
BLACK/LYNCH (2001) (see row 5, Table 1) and use the IAB Establishment Panel. 
Especial emphasis is placed upon on selection issues and unobserved plant heterogeneity. 
The study by Wolf and Zwick (2002) in row 4 of the table provides the template for the 
other two studies. Wolf and Zwick focus on the productivity of HPWPs. They identify 
seven such practices, which are reduced to two independent factors – termed 
“organizational changes” (participatory practices such as team work) and ‘incentives’ (e.g., 
profit sharing) – using principal components analysis. The authors fit an augmented Cobb-
Douglas production function to cross-section data for 1999, including a selectivity-adjusted 
specification. They also fit a Cobb Douglas function to data for 1996-99 using panel 
estimation methods, and derive a fixed time invariant establishment-specific effect for each 
plant after Black and Lynch, which values are then regressed on the time invariant 
covariates – including organizational changes and incentives – again allowing for 
 
19 The exception is that the latter do find a positive effect of profit sharing on labour productivity for the uncovered 
sector which they speculate reflects union opposition to profit sharing. selection. Note that the dataset only enables the authors to identify whether or not the 
innovative practices were present at a point in time, not when they had been introduced.  
As shown in Table 4, both selection and accounting for structural differences matter. The 
positive effect on productivity of incentive mechanisms, observed in both cross section and 
in the panel, seem to result from such schemes being introduced in times of plenty, when 
firms are doing well. That is, after correction for the endogeneity of such measures, the 
variable is no longer statistically insignificant. For their part, the effect of organizational 
changes is statistically insignificant in cross section, with and without correction for 
selection. However, the coefficient estimate is both positive and well determined in the 
panel estimates, and after controlling for selection strengthens somewhat. The main 
message of this study, therefore, is that firms which introduce organizational changes 
seemingly have unobserved time invariant characteristics that decrease their productivity. 
Expressed differently, participatory work practices raise productivity.  
The results pertaining to incentive mechanisms clearly qualify the results of 
FITZROY/KRAFT (1995) (row 2 of Table 4) who control for the endogeneity of profit 
sharing but not unobserved firm heterogeneity. Wolf and Zwick nevertheless do argue that 
works councils work – the coefficient estimate for the variable is positive and statistically 
significant in the second step panel procedure – even if they do not seem to influence 
organizational change. Finally, two other results from the cross section part of this study 
might be noted. Not only is there no evidence of synergies between the two sets of 
innovative practices but also very few instances of complementarities between their 
components. 
The role of the work council is secondary in Wolf and Zwick. In the next study in the table, 
it shares equal billing with innovative work practices. ZWICK (2003) (row 5) considers 
just those practices found to be statistically significant in Wolf and Zwick – namely, 
organizational changes, now termed ‘participation’ – and considers their impact on 
productivity over the same interval, albeit using a different panel estimator for the (first 
stage) production function and now controlling for the endogeneity of works council 
presence (as well as that of the participation variable). Other differences reside in the 
measurement of capital and the construction of the participation measure. 
Zwick’s second-step regression results for a specification in which works councils are 
assumed exogenous indicates that the innovative work practice(s) is positive and well 
determined, elevating productivity by 25 percent. However, accounting for the nonrandom 
distribution of works councils in an endogenous switching regression model shows that the 
pro-productive effect of participatory work practices (or one such practice) only obtains in 
works council firms. Although the story is similar to that told by Wolf and Zwick – in the 
sense that innovatory practices are conceived to rectify structural productivity deficits – the 
main result is very different: innovations only bear fruit in works council regimes. This 
result is analogous to that of COOKE (1994) for the United States (see Table 1, row 4). No 
other German study reaches so stark a conclusion. Unfortunately, the coefficient estimate 
for the participation variable in works council plants is only marginally significant and it is 
not clear that it differs from the statistically insignificant coefficient estimate for 
participation in the sample of plants without works councils.  
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One of the routes through which works councils and all voice institutions are supposed to 
influence productivity is by encouraging investments by the firm in training. Although the 
German literature has dwelt at some length on the labour turnover issue, there has been 
little direct analysis of further training. A rare exception is the final study in row 6 of Table 
4, in which ZWICK (2002) examines the determinants of such training and its impact on 
labour productivity. As in the two preceding studies, the basic framework is again a mix of 
cross section and two-stage panel estimation with endogenous training. In addition to 
detailed establishment controls, the equations include three other innovative work 
practices. These are identical to those previously grouped under ‘participation’ in the row 5 
study, namely, a shifting of responsibilities to lower levels in the hierarchy (termed 
‘employee participation’), the presence of teamwork and self-directed groups, and work 
groups/units with their own costs and results accounting. These three practices are now 
treated as exogenous, as is works council presence. 
Zwick finds that training intensity (share of trained employees in the workforce) as well as 
several types of training (especially formal external training) have positive effects on 
productivity in cross section and in the second-step panel estimation procedure. In both 
cases, accounting for the endogeneity of training either by predicting training intensity or 
by including an inverse Mills ratio term (the probability of a training presence) in the 
regression tends to increases the magnitude of well determined coefficient estimates, 
suggesting that there is a greater tendency to train when productivity is low. The effect of 
the panel estimation is also to increase the measured impact of training. But of the other 
innovative work practices none is statistically significant in cross section and just one 
(shifting of responsibilities to lower levels in the hierarchy) is significant in most of the 
second-step panel estimates. A positive association between works council presence and 
productivity is discerned in cross section but in the second-step panel estimates the 
coefficient estimates for this variable are statistically insignificant throughout. Unlike the 
work practices, however, work councils are included as a determinant of training (i.e. 
training intensity) and their influence is positive and statistically significant, a result that is 
ascribed to the absence or attenuation of hold up – this time on the part of employers – in 
works council regimes.  
The increasing sophistication of the German studies in the attempt to control for selection 
into either innovative working practices, including training, or works council status while 
taking account of unobserved plant heterogeneity has to be measured against the 
limitations of the data. As far as selection into works council status is concerned, we do 
know that works council presence is not random but is related to establishment size and the 
structure of the work force, among other things. However, the introduction or presence of a 
works council is not the result of a rational choice made by the owners or managers of an 
establishment based on comparing costs and benefits; rather, it is the results of actions 
taken by the employees. Employee action might well be related to the past performance of 
the establishment, but whether an establishment has a works council at a point in time 
should not be viewed as caused by contemporaneous productivity. This might suggest that one can treat works council status as exogenous to the establishment, not least given the 
difficulties of identifying the works council equation in a convincing manner. 
Identification issues also loom large when it comes to the identifying equations for 
innovative work practices, including training. Understandably, analysts have switched 
between treating works councils and innovative work practices as endogenous according to 
the emphasis of the particular study, but this approach has produced some inconsistencies.  
More might be expected from panel estimates that control for unobserved plant 
heterogeneity. Unfortunately, there is the problem that that works council status tends not 
to change over time – for example, in balanced panels from the IAB Establishment Panel, 
1997-2000, around two percent of plants change their works council status. And as regards 
the innovative works practices, we lack longitudinal data altogether. Given the lack of 
temporal variation in works councils status and HPWPs for either reason, the Black-Lynch 
procedure has found favour. The problem is course that the estimated coefficients for 
works councils and innovative practices in the second step may be biased by reason of 
correlation between these variables and unobserved time-invariant establishment 
characteristics. For example, as noted earlier, better managers are more likely to be 
observed in plants with HPWPs so that what appears to be a productivity effect of 
innovative practices is good management. A further problem is that if we lack longitudinal 
information on HRWPs, we cannot assume that their frequency did not change materially 
over the sample period in question.  
Despite these and other concerns (not least the lack of information on the numbers of 
workers covered by HPWPs and on ‘type’ of works council), the German literature 
suggests that works councils and innovative practices may have favorable effects on 
productivity. Indeed, we have reviewed material that attributes major productivity gains to 
each. But average wage council effects are unlikely to be strong. We mainly base this 
conclusion on estimates obtained for samples of plants employing between 21 and 100 
workers where there is a ‘balanced’ representation of works council and non-works council 
establishments and where the powers of works councils are a datum. As far as HPWPs are 
concerned, it would be idle to claim that there is agreement as to which measures work. 
The disputation over profit sharing is the main case in point. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
when we come to consider the interaction between works councils and innovative work 
practices the situation is not transparent. But we think the evidence supports the notion that 
innovative work practices allow works council firms to achieve improved productivity if 
not necessarily higher productivity than non-works council firms.  
One further caveat is the near exclusive focus in recent German work on the productivity 
outcome. We have no information on possible increases in labour costs occasioned by 
operating HPWPs, as suggested by some U.S. research. We do know that wages are higher 
in works council regimes (see Table 2, row 1), but we can infer little from this because 
there is no indication that works council presence has any effect on the excess of wages 
over those laid down under collective agreements. It remains a possibility that works 
councils may cause wage or incentive pay drift, or that they inflate nonwage costs, but 
there is as yet no real evidence to substantiate this. 
Two final issues are whether works councils and HPWRs are substitutes or complements, 
and the status of the often-encountered argument that German employers would have to 
invent works councils were they not legislated. There is evidence to favour both 
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substitutability and complementarity. Examples of the former include the finding of a 
negative association between team-working and works council presence and the greater 
frequency of HPWPs in the absence of works councils (or, in their presence, where works 
councils are antagonistic). Examples of the latter are the positive association between 
works councils and group incentives and training.  
The idea that works councils would have to be invented were they not legislated is 
certainly not a finding that leaps from the pages of the early works council literature or 
even from the more recent literature without qualification. One such qualification may be 
plant size. Unfortunately, it is difficult to test the argument that works councils are 
beneficial in large establishments. This is because nearly all such plants are covered by 
works councils, and conversely for small plants. Another qualification is that 
establishments may need to be covered by a collective agreement to blunt the bargaining or 
hold-up implications of codetermination. A final set of qualifications would presumably 
involve the contribution of innovative working practices and cooperative relations.  
5.  Conclusions 
We have examined the effects of worker representation in unions and works councils, and 
of employee involvement/innovative work practices – and their interaction – on firm 
performance. In view of the doubts concerning the performance effects of high 
performance work practices and controversies surrounding the effects of worker 
representation – both of which aspects are addressed in our analysis – the results of the 
exercise might have been predicted to be both compartmentalized and pessimistic. But we 
have largely interpreted the worker representation literature as indicating that the effects of 
unions on productivity are likely to be small on average so that we should look to factors 
such as innovative work practices in explaining the diversity in the effects of worker 
representation in different settings. Expressed in terms of the theoretical conjectures on 
unions, the interaction of worker representation and HPWPs provides a practical means of 
peering inside the union black box. We would incline to the same interpretation of the 
works council institution, even if unobserved works council type may turn out to be a more 
important source of variation in overall performance. 
We reported evidence of positive HPWP effects in both countries and also of positive 
interactions with worker representation. The suggestion is, then, that combinations of 
innovative practices and worker representation can yield substantial productivity gains. In 
Germany, HPWPs may be an important means of restoring competitiveness and works 
councils may assist in their introduction. Yet there should be no pretence to precision in all 
of this in the sense of the literature having uncovered a well determined hierarchy for 
productivity performance, or blueprint for the future of unions in particular. This is not 
unexpected and reflects the limitations of both literatures – namely, the notion of collective voice and the high performance paradigm – underscored throughout by pronounced 
measurement difficulties. Here the cautionary remarks of WOOD/DE MENEZES (1998) 




Addendum: The British Evidence on Unionism and Firm 
Performance  
Introduction 
There is no doubt that unions declined in Britain after 1979, after a period of period of 
substantial growth. At that time some 53 percent of workers were union members, but by 
1999 this had fallen to 28 percent. Correspondingly, there also occurred a sharp fall in the 
share of employees whose wages are set by collective bargaining: from 70 percent in 1980 
to around 45 percent in the mid-1990s. Moreover, all indicators of union presence point in 
the same direction, and for all sectors other than the public sector (MACHIN, 2000).  
And since 1980 there have also occurred some profound changes in observed union effects, 
some of which are more controversial than others. We should perhaps preface our 
presentation of establishment performance outcomes – along the dimensions of financial 
performance, productivity, investment, employment, and plant closings – with some brief 
remarks on the course of the union-nonunion differential, one of the more controversial 
areas. It has been conventional to argue that the union premium remained more or less 
stable during the 1980s but declined fairly precipitously during the first half of the 
following decade (see STEWART, 1995; HILDRETH, 1999). That said, studies based on 
individual rather than workplace data pointed to persistence in the union premium of 
around 10 percent (e.g. BLANCHFLOWER, 1997). Nevertheless, the most recent work 
using individual-level data now seems to confirm the workplace findings (e.g. MACHIN, 
2001), so that wage evidence does after all tend to favour a marked decline in the union 
differential. Today, the premium seems to have all but disappeared (e.g. BRYSON, 2002a). 
 
Establishment Performance Outcomes 
 
Profitability 
Almost all of the early British studies pointed to negative effects of various indicators of 
union presence on financial performance/profitability. Some of the more recent evidence is 
reported in Table A.1. The starting point is the study by Machin and STEWART (1996) 
that identifies a sharp decline in the union effect on productivity over the first three WIRS. 
Note that by 1990 any negative effect was confined to closed shop or analogous situations 
in conjunction with some degree of market power. The second row contains the results of a 
replication of the previous study by ADDISON/BELFIELD (2001) using the 1998 WERS 
which, if  anything, points to a sharper retardation in the negative effect of union 
recognition. 40 
Table A1. Union Effects on Profitability 
Study  Data / Methodology  EI/HPWP measure  Works council variable  Findings 
1. Machin and 
Stewart (1996). 
 
WIRS 80, WIRS 86; 






Union recognition (manual), 
closed shop/management 
recommends unionism (manual). 
 
Negative effect of union recognition halved during the 1950s.  By 1990 
a significantly negative effect was confined to the closed shop.  
Moreover, that effect was conditional on presence of market power (as 
proxied by relative size of the establishment). 
2. Addison and 
Belfield (2001). 




As above.  Coefficient estimates for union recognition and closed 
shop/management recommends unionism variables statistically 
insignificant throughout. 
3. McNabb and 
Whitfield (1998). 
WIRS 90. Probit.  Financial 
performance better 
than average. 
Union recognition.  Union effect hinges on interaction with financial participation and 
employee involvement mechanisms. Union effect statistically 
insignificant in conjunction with financial participation. Union effect 
positive and statistically significant in the presence of employee 
involvement schemes, and is negative and statistically significant in 
their absence.  
 
4. Addison and 
Belfield (2000). 
 
WERS 98. Probit.  As above.  As above.  Coefficient estimate for union recognition statistically insignificant 
irrespective of employee involvement and financial participation 
mechanisms 
5. Booth and 
McCulloch 
(1999). 




Union recognition, closed shop; 
manual and nonmanual union 
recognition, manual closed shop, 
nonmanual closed shop. 
Positive and statistically significant effect of union recognition; negative 
and statistically significant effect of closed shop. But these overall 
effects hinge on union type. Coefficient estimates for recognition and 
closed shop are only statistically significant for nonmanual unions.  
 
6. Conyon and 
Freeman (2001). 
 













Sample of 494 firms, 
 




Coefficient estimates for union recognition negative and statistically  
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sales. bargaining  structure. 
 
significant but declining through time. Strongest negative effects 
observed in single establishment firms and where different unions 
bargain jointly with the firm at the industry level. Fixed effects 
specifications show that derecognized firms have faster increases in 
profitability. Also fragmentation of bargaining structure associated with 
higher profitability. 
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, financial performance is based on a five-element categorical measure derived from the manager respondent’s assessment of the financial 








The study in the third row is of interest because it attempts to capture the effects of 
financial participation and employee involvement practices on financial performance. In 
particular, it is argued that employee involvement will be more capable of yielding a 
dividend where it is associated with financial participation – and, further, that different 
types of employee involvement and financial participation will vary in their impact on 
financial performance. Mixed effects are duly reported for union recognition: unions have 
positive impact where the organization practices downward communication and upward 
communication, but in the absence of such schemes the union effect is negative and 
statistically insignificant. But ADDISON/BELFIELD'S (2000) replication of this study 
(row 4) finds no statistically significant effect of union recognition for any concatenation 
of employee involvement and financial participation.   
The study in row 5 allows for a wider variety of union measures. BOOTH/ MCCULLOCH 
(1999) find no evidence of a hierachy of (nonmanual) union effects on aggregate. 
However, disaggregation by union type – manual versus nonmanual – reveals such effects 
for nonmanual unions: the effect of 'recognition only' is negative and statistically 
significant and the presence of a closed shop increases the absolute value of the union 
effect. In contrast, manual unions have no discernible impact on financial performance.  
The principal concern in the study by CONYON/FREEMAN (2001) is the role of (four 
types of) financial participation on financial performance (row 6), so that the union effects 
for the 1998 WERS cited in the table are secondary – and, interestingly, never commented 
on in the paper. As can be seen, the association between union recognition and financial 
performance is negative and statistically significant throughout (i.e. irrespective of the 
form of financial participation). Unlike the row 3 study, it is argued that employee 
involvement and financial participation are complementary. 
The final study by MENEZES-FILHO (1999) is notable for its use of financial data per se, 
and incorporation of bargaining structure (and theory) (row 7). The main result is that 
although union firms have lower profitability overall this effect narrowed between 1984 
and 1990, and had all but disappeared by the end of the sample period. That being said, 
consistent with the author's theoretical priors, there is evidence that profit retardation 
remains strongest in areas where unions have greater bargaining power. Bargaining power 
is shown to be greatest in single establishments (vis-à-vis multiestablishment undertakings) 
and among multiestablishment firms where the firm bargains jointly and an industry 
agreement applies.  
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Table A 2. . Union Effects on Productivity and Changes in Productivity 





328 trading firms from 
EXSTAT, 1984-89. 
Production function 
estimated using panel 
regression methods. 
Growth in log real 
sales. 
Union recognition, changes in 
union status. 
For union recognition along, the union effect is negative and 
statistically insignificant for 1984-97, but positive and statistically 
significant for 1988-89 (+3-4%). For changes in union status, 
repudiation of the closed shop has no incremental impact over 
(favorable) effect of union presence (1988-89) but derecognitions 
considerably elevate differential productivity growth of union 
sector.  
 




(i) 284 firms, 1995-98. Fixed 
effects production function 
estimates. 
 




Union effect negative but statistically insignificant throughout. 















Union bargaining power, 
proxied by separate multi- 
unionism and firm endorsement 
of union membership, inter al. 
 
Multiunionism associated with significantly lower productivity. 
Where management recommends unionism there is a positive 
effect on labour productivity. Also some suggestion that union 
effect might be positive where labour demand elasticity is higher. 
4. Fernie and 
Metcalf 
(1995). 
WIRS 90.  (i) Relative labour 
productivity. 
Union recognition alone. Pre-
entry closed shop, post-entry 
closed shop, management 
recommends union member-
ship, union recognition only. 
For the one-dimension measure, the union effect is negative but 
only marginally significant. For the fuller representation, no 
hierarchy of effect beyond union recognition only, which is 
negatively signed and highly significant.  44 




As above.  For the one-dimension dimension measure, the union effect is 
negative but only marginally significant. For the fuller 
representation, only the pre-entry closed shop is associated with 












Coefficient estimates for each union measure are negative but 
statistically insignificant throughout. 
 
 
  (ii) As above.  As above.  For union recognition alone, the union effect is positive and 
statistically significant. For the fuller representation, no hierarchy 
of effect beyond union recognition only, which is again positively 
signed and highly significant.  
 
Note: The relative labour productivity measure is a categorical variable based on management perceptions of labour productivity of the workplace compared with other 
similar workplaces (WIRS 90) or workplaces in the same industry (WERS 98). The labour productivity improvement measure is a categorical variable based on management 







The sparse early British evidence points to negative effects of unionism on firm and 
establishment productivity, despite contemporaneous estimates of the union wage premium 
of around 10 percent (e.g. MACHIN, 1991). The dominant theme of the newer literature 
reviewed in Table A.2 is that unionized firms/plants increased their productivity most at 
the end of the 1980s (and arguably in 1979-84 too) and/or that there is no longer evidence 
of a productivity shortfall in union firms/establishments. The evidence is not 
overwhelming, however, so that it would be premature to claim more than what has been 
observed is a reduction in the disadvantages of unionism. The relevant factors here include 
the possibility that least productive unionized undertakings may have been evolved out of 
the system (for this reason the empirical suggestion that the union effects were most 
positive in situations where competitive pressures were more acute is not altogether 
compelling), the fact that the strongest productivity gains are actually reported for union 
derecognitions, and to some degree the odd timing of the observed spurts of improvement.  
As in the case of parallel developments in profitability, reviewed earlier, it is conventional 
to ascribe the observed changes to the impact of the Thatcher reforms in conjunction with 
heightened competitive pressures (e.g. GREGG/MACHIN/METCALF, 1993, p.895). At 
issue of course is whether the observed changes will persist. Also worrying is the apparent 
shift in the effects of other covariates – not just the union argument – on the productivity 
outcome indicators in the WIRS/WERS.  
Investment 
Consistent with the U.S. evidence reviewed in the main paper, the early British research 
also provides evidence of some negative effects of unions on investment in physical capital 
(DENNY/NICKELL, 1992). However, this does not carry over to investments in intangible 
capital. While they are able to replicate HIRSCH’S (1991) results for the United States, 
MENEZES-FILHO/ULPH/VAN REENEN (1998) do not obtain similar results for the 
United Kingdom. Indeed, in their recent review, MENEZES-FILHO/VAN REENEN 
(2003) contrast the very different results for the United States on the one hand and Britain 
and continental Europe on the other. Although the association between unionism and R&D 
is negative in this bloc as well, it is seemingly driven by unions being concentrated in 
older, low-tech industries. In interpreting these results, the authors critique the notion that 
unions will hold up firms by expropriating sunk R&D investments through demanding 
higher wages while also observing that the hold-up problem may be mitigated by strategic 
incentives to compete in R&D races. The latter such considerations imply that the union 
effect on R&D might exhibit nonlinearities – being positive at lower levels of union 
density. 
Employment 
We turn next to the evidence of union effects on employment, broadly interpreted. There is 
reasonable agreement in the WIRS/WIRS on the seeming role of unions in retarding 
employment growth or exaggerating employment reduction. As can be seen from Table 
A.3, there is the suggestion that unionized establishments in the 1980s tended to grow by 3 46 
percent less per year than their nonunionized counterparts. There was some early 
disputation over the results reported by BLANCHFLOWER/MILLWARD/OSWALD 
(1991) for 1980-84 because of the concern that unionized firms at this time were more 
likely to see an erosion of restrictive practices (partly related to overmanning arrangements 
and demarcation) so that union plants were more likely to be shedding labour. But this 
criticism does not seem to be unduly damaging. First, the organizational change measure in 
the WIRS used to proxy such reform of working conditions does not overturn the negative 
impact of the union density measure on employment for the specific time period under 
consideration. Second, BOOTH/MCCULLOCH (1999) (row 2) report for later intervals 
that the union effect on employment is robust to the inclusion of organizational change 
measures. Subject to obvious limitations – the data-driven failure to model the dynamics of 
the employment adjustment process – there is a large measure of accord in repeated cross 
sections of the workplace surveys that union slow job growth. 
That said, there is some lingering ambiguity as to some other relationships in the 
employment change equations. Thus, for example, ADDISON/BELFIELD (2001) (row 4) 
report very different findings for financial participation arguments than do 
FERNIE/METCALF (1995) (row 3). On the other hand, neither finds evidence of a 
hierarchy of union effects (i.e. greater retardation of employment growth/heavier 
employment decline in circumstances where unions are more powerful). In this connection, 
BRYSON (2002b) has recently argued that stronger unions are more likely to bargain over 
employment so that one should not expect to see declines in employment for this subset of 
unions. 
Not shown in the table is union impact on quits and absenteeism rates. But there is no 
disagreement in successive WIRS/WERS of the union role in reducing quits, even if the 
data are less than ideal. Rather, disagreement centres on absenteeism rates: 
ADDISON/BELFIELD (2001) report sharply higher absenteeism rates in union regimes 
using WERS 98 whereas FERNIE/METCALF (1995) report no such association for WIRS 
90. There has been no investigation in Britain of the effect of quits in improving 
productivity and of absenteeism in reducing it.   
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Table A 3. Union Effects on Employment 
Study Dataset  / 
Methodology 






Log employment (effectively an 
employment change equation as 
coefficient estimate on lagged 
dependent variable approximates 
1). 
Union recognition; union 
density; post-entry closed shop, 
pre-entry closed shop, 
membership. 
Coefficient estimate for union recognition is negative and statistically significant. 
Effect of density is better determined . Together the recognition and density results 
imply that union establishments contract 3 percentage points more per year than their 
nonunion counterparts. Allowing for different union types, union membership and 
pre-entry closed shop are associated with lower employment growth (though the latter 
variable is poorly determined) while the effect of the post-entry closed shop is positive 
and statistically significant. 




Change in log employment, 
1989-90 and 1987-90. 
Union recognition.   Coefficient estimate for union recognition is negative and statistically significant 
throughout. The union-induced reduction in employment growth is 2.6% (5.7%) for 
1989-90 (1987-90). 




Change in employment 1984-90.  Union recognition only; pre-
entry closed shop, post-entry 
closed shop, management 
recommends unionism, 
recognition alone.  
For union recognition only, the association between employment change and union 
recognition is negative and statistically significant. For the fuller characterization of 
unionism, the coefficient estimates for all but the post-entry closed shop are negative 
and highly statistically significant. No hierarchy of effect. 




Change in employment, 1993-
98. 
As above.  For union recognition only, the association between employment change and union 
recognition is negative and highly statistically significant. For the fuller 
characterization of unionism, only the two weaker measures of union presence are 
associated with a material reduction in quits.  





The last outcome indicator we examine is plant closings. The evidence summarized in 
Table A.4 is again mixed. Studies based on WIRS 84 reveal scant evidence of any 
association between unionism and plant closings, irrespective of the union measure (see 
row 1). Note also the absence of a hierarchy of union effect: more powerful unions, as 
proxied by the magnitude of the wage premium or presence of the closed shop, have no 
discernible incremental effect on closings.  
The plot thickens when we come to consider the most recent evidence. Broadly speaking, 
the sign of the coefficient estimate for the union variable is positive and statistically 
significant in the two studies using WERS 98 (rows 2-3). But this broad result hides as 
much as it reveals. Although reporting a material and robust positive association between 
either of two measures of unionism – recognition for collective bargaining purposes and 
union coverage – ADDISON/HEY-WOOD/WEI (2001) find that this relation holds only 
for establishments that are part of larger (i.e. multiestablishment) undertakings. For single-
plant entities (here firms), the direction of the association is reversed. (All studies support 
the more general result that single independent plants are less likely to close than their 
counterparts that are part of multi-establishment undertakings). The authors interpret the 
former result as consistent with a decline in union bargaining power in the wake of a 
decade of anti-union legislation, either by emboldening employers in multi-plant 
enterprises to close unionized establishments, or by weakening union influence over 
employment in such settings (see MACHIN, 1993). The single-plant result, on the other 
hand, is rationalized in terms of (differential) union concessions in conjunction with rents.  
While not contesting these findings, the recent study by BRYSON (2004) (row 4) offers a 
very different interpretation of the positive association between plant closings and 
unionism. Rather, it is now union weakness – accentuated by the legislation – that is said to 
explain the sea change in union effect detected in the more recent workplace survey. 
Bryson reports that where unions are strong the coefficient estimate for unionism is no 
longer statistically significant. Stronger unions are identified by the closed shop and a 
combination of high density, bargaining coverage and on-site representatives, inter al. The 
'weak union' result is taken to be consistent with such unions being an ineffective voice for 
workers – and an inefficient agent for management as well – and conversely for strong 
unions. However, while downplaying rent seeking and emphasizing the ineffective 
voice/weakened agency function of weak unions, Bryson reports that where unions bargain 




Table A.4. Union Effects on Plant Closings 
Study  Dataset/ Methodology  Outcome measure  Union variable  Findings 
1. Machin (1995).  1984 WIRS, using data on 
plants that subsequently 
closed from the WIRS 
1984-90 Panel. Probit 
model. 
Union recognition.  Log number of employees, proportion nonmanual 
workers, single plant, manufacturing dummies, 
below average financial performance, operating 
well below capacity.  
Union recognition effect statistically 
insignificant both overall and by type of 
union (manual and nonmanual), and in the 
presence or otherwise of the closed shop. 
Result robust to inclusion of one-digit 
industry dummies. 
2. Addison, Hey-
wood, and Wei 
(2003). 
1990 WIRS, using data on 
plants that subsequently 
closed from WERS 1990-
98 Panel. Probit model. 
Union recognition; union 
coverage.  
Establishment size, establishment age, proportion 
female, proportion manual, proportion 
professional/technical, proportion short-term 
contracts, wide range of employee-involvement and 
participation mechanisms, industrial relations 
climate, technology variables, flexibility at 
workplace, change in ownership, market power, 
layoff experience, export exposure, regional 
unemployment rate, one-digit and more detailed 





Robust positive and statistically significant 
association between union measures and 
probability of plant closure. But the result is 
driven by plants that are part of multi-
establishment undertakings. For single-
establishment firms, the union effect(s) is 
negative and generally statistically 
insignificant. 
3. Bryson (2004).  As above. Probit model.  Union recognition; union 
strength (3 measures); 
union type; number of 
unions; bargaining 
arrangements (e.g. single 
vs. joint bargaining); and 
bargaining scope.  
Industry-level union density, log number of 
employees, proportion non- manual, single plant, 
(10) regional dummies, (18) two-digit industry 
controls, degree of competition, use of flexible 
contracts, financial performance better than 
average, operating considerably below capacity, 
increase in employment.  
Union measure(s) positively associated with 
plant closure. But magnitude and 
significance of the effect is sensitive to form 
of measure. Statistically significant effects 
where union is weak, for manual worker 
unions, single unions, and where union 
bargains over physical working conditions. 
   
 Unions, Employee Involvement and Other Workplace Practices 
As we have seen, two of the studies considered earlier examine the association between 
unionism and employee involvement/financial participation and financial performance. But 
the key study is WOOD/DE MENEZES (1998), exploiting data from the 1990 WIRS and 
the Employers’ Manpower and Skills Practices Survey. The authors first attempt to test 
whether the range of employee involvement and participative mechanisms used in the 
literature form a unity and can be used as indicators of a high commitment orientation on 
the part of management. Wood and de Menezes use latent variable analysis to search for 
identifiable patterns in the use of twenty-three such practices. They are unable to identify 
high commitment management as a well-defined continuous variable. But they are able to 
fit a latent class model to the data, that is, identify a progression of types of high 
commitment management. There are four such types: high HCM, medium-low HCM, low-
medium HCM, and low HCM. 
As far as unionism is concerned, Wood and de Menezes first examine the association 
between union recognition and high commitment management. Neither high HCM nor low 
HCM workplaces emerge as distinctive with respect to unionism. This suggests among 
other things that the tendency of the (British) industrial relations literature to treat 
nonunion workplaces as ‘bleak authoritarian houses’ is erroneous. Second, the authors 
include the establishment’s HCM class as an argument in conventional performance 
equations alongside unionism and controls for workplace characteristics and industry 
affiliation. They examine seven such performance outcomes: labour productivity, change 
in labour productivity, financial performance, job creation, employee relations climate, 
quits, and absenteeism. High HCM establishments are not found to be more effective than 
others. That is, in no case do they perform better than all the others on any performance 
criteria. For example, although high HCM plants do have better employment growth and 
better financial performance that the two medium HCM categories, this does not carry over 
to the low HCM plants. Evidently different types of plants can perform differently 
according to the outcome measure. The plot only thickens when it comes to the effect of 
union recognition since five out of seven coefficient estimates are negative, of which four 
are statistically significant. (For a more optimistic interpretation, see METCALF, 2003.)  
  
Interpretation 
We have discussed changes in the impact of British unionism on firm performance, 
examining en passant the modern notion that the decline in union influence has downside 
efficiency consequences. Our findings may be summarized as follows. First, there is 
evidence of a diminution of union effects on wages, financial performance and 
productivity through time. As the measures are not commensurate, we cannot quantify the 
degree of efficiency improvement stemming from these changes in unionized regimes. 
Arguably, the economic impact could have been small, but we incline to the view that 
more than redistribution (from workers) has been involved. But by the same token, certain 
unfavourable effects of unionism persist (e.g. slower employment growth and higher 
absenteeism) and so it is also appropriate to conclude that there has been a reduction in the 
disadvantages of unionism, not a reversal. Larger efficiency gains are likely to have 
accrued from the decline in union density and the ability of newly formed enterprises to 
avoid union organization. 
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Second, we have found little direct support for the revisionist notion that the reduction in 
union power is responsible for worse outcomes. The argument that unions have to be 
strong to be an effective vehicle of pro-productive voice and to act as an authoritative 
agent of the employer principal has been found to be pushing things too far 
(ADDISON/BELFIELD, 2004). In the specific context of plant closings given that there is 
no evidence of a union effect in the WIRS 84, why should the reduction in union power 
have yielded a significantly positive association between union recognition/density and 
plant closings in the WERS 90? The Bryson argument would be that the legislation led to 
weaker unions that could neither deliver voice nor act as a responsible agent of the 
employer. Unfortunately, the test hinges on differences in effect between strong and weak 
unions rather changes in union power. We favour the alternative efficiency argument that 
there were too few closings in earlier years. In other words, we would argue from the 
finding for multiestablishments in the literature (see Table A.4, row 3) that management in 
such undertakings have taken the opportunity to rid themselves of inefficient plants. This 
contention gels with the reasoning of MANNING (1993), who argues that the requirement 
for pre-strike ballots (under the Conservative administration's Trade Union Act of 1984) 
may have led to a loss of union influence over employment. Unions, so the argument goes, 
had hitherto kept open unprofitable plants by threatening to strike profitable ones. The new 
need to ballot members destroyed the credibility of this mechanism because workers whose 
jobs were not in jeopardy would not vote for a strike.  
Caveats attach to the interpretation that the workplace surveys unambiguously reveal 
evidence of a decline in union influence (see, in particular, the analysis of the WERS 98 
panel by ADDISON/BELFIELD, 2002). A final issue is the interaction between unionism 
and high performance work practices. Here the British evidence has nicely exposed the 
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